Corporate Law and the Myth of Efficient Market Control by Bratton, William W & Sepe, Simone
University of Pennsylvania Carey Law School 
Penn Law: Legal Scholarship Repository 
Faculty Scholarship at Penn Law 
2020 
Corporate Law and the Myth of Efficient Market Control 
William W. Bratton 
University of Pennsylvania Carey Law School 
Simone Sepe 
The University of Arizona James E. Rogers College of Law 
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/faculty_scholarship 
 Part of the Business Administration, Management, and Operations Commons, Business Organizations 
Law Commons, Industrial Organization Commons, Law and Economics Commons, and the Organizational 
Behavior and Theory Commons 
Repository Citation 
Bratton, William W. and Sepe, Simone, "Corporate Law and the Myth of Efficient Market Control" (2020). 
Faculty Scholarship at Penn Law. 2073. 
https://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/faculty_scholarship/2073 
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by Penn Law: Legal Scholarship Repository. It has been 
accepted for inclusion in Faculty Scholarship at Penn Law by an authorized administrator of Penn Law: Legal 
Scholarship Repository. For more information, please contact PennlawIR@law.upenn.edu. 
\\jciprod01\productn\C\CRN\105-3\CRN304.txt unknown Seq: 1  3-AUG-20 14:14
CORPORATE LAW AND THE MYTH OF 
EFFICIENT MARKET CONTROL 
William W. Bratton† & Simone M. Sepe‡ 
In recent times, there has been an unprecedented shift in 
power from managers to shareholders, a shift that realizes the 
long-held theoretical aspiration of market control of the corpo-
ration.  This Article subjects the market control paradigm to 
comprehensive economic examination and finds it wanting. 
The market control paradigm relies on a narrow economic 
model that focuses on one problem only: management agency 
costs.  With the rise of shareholder power, we need a wider 
lens that also takes in market prices, investor incentives, and 
information asymmetries.  General equilibrium (GE) theory 
provides that lens.  Several lessons follow from reference to 
this higher-order economic theory.  First, the presumption that 
markets can efficiently coordinate the economy is unfounded, 
unless one relies on heroic assumptions.  Second, GE shows 
that shareholders suffer from misaligned incentives, undercut-
ting any normative program grounded in shareholder empow-
erment.  The third lesson is negative, as there are no 
economically founded instructions for addressing the trade-
offs between agency costs reduction and market inefficiency 
implied by the new shareholder corporation.  Policy implica-
tions also follow.  Given the lack of a clear normative template, 
only private ordering can be counted on to address each corpo-
ration’s specific tradeoffs between agency costs and market 
inefficiency.  This conclusion leads to an endorsement of Dela-
ware’s equitable adjudication system, the flexibility of which 
is well suited to policing the bargaining process between man-
agers and empowered shareholders. 
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INTRODUCTION 
A central question in corporate legal theory is whether 
large corporations should be conceived as hierarchical en-
claves that operate apart from markets or as entities that oper-
ate within markets and under market control.  The majority 
favors market control, making two basic assumptions: first, 
shareholders have the right incentives to mitigate the manage-
rial agency problem, and, second, competitive markets are in-
trinsically superior to institutions as coordinators of 
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production.1  In practice, recent developments appear to vindi-
cate this majority view, turning shareholder empowerment 
from a normative aspiration to a positive reality.2  The rise of 
hedge funds and other activist investors has brought an un-
precedented shift in power from managers to shareholders, 
who are now empowered to determine business decisions at 
publicly traded companies. 
We take the occasion of these transformative changes to 
put corporate legal theory’s majority view to the test, through a 
comprehensive economic examination of the claim of efficient 
market control.  This examination brings to the forefront a sub-
stantial theory of markets and prices that has never been ex-
plored before in corporate law, general equilibrium theory (GE). 
Reference to GE yields three major results.  First, it exposes the 
majority view as wanting, vindicating the work of scholars such 
as Lynn Stout, who had long warned us against the risks of 
ever-increasing shareholder power.3  As this Article will show, 
economic theory does not support a normative template in 
favor of market control of the corporation but instead poses a 
fundamental tradeoff between agency cost reduction and mar-
ket inefficiency.  Second, once we take this economic finding 
back to legal theory, private bargaining emerges as better 
suited to resolve this tradeoff than would be corporate law re-
form.  Third, this finding also has implications for corporate 
law, supporting Delaware’s equitable adjudication system and 
its flexible case-by-case approach as especially well suited to 
the mediation of the bargaining process between managers and 
empowered shareholders. 
We begin our analysis by tracing corporate legal theory’s 
equation of market control and economic efficiency back to its 
1 See infra subparts I.B–C. 
2 See infra section I.C.2. 
3 Lynn Stout was among the most prominent voices to challenge the share-
holder-centric view of the corporation, defending an alternative “team-production 
model” that accounted for the role of other stakeholders in the corporate organiza-
tion and warned against the inefficiencies of unconstrained shareholder power. 
See, e.g., LYNN STOUT, THE SHAREHOLDER VALUE MYTH: HOW PUTTING SHAREHOLDERS 
FIRST  HARMS  INVESTORS, CORPORATIONS AND THE  PUBLIC (2012) (highlighting both 
possible and empirical impacts of shareholder primacy on various stakeholders); 
Iman Anabtawi & Lynn Stout, Fiduciary Duties for Activist Shareholders, 60 STAN. 
L. REV. 1255 (2008) (analyzing the role that fiduciary duty law could play in 
constraining the worst tendencies of shareholder primacy); Margaret M. Blair & 
Lynn A. Stout, A Team Production Theory of Corporate Law, 85 VA. L. REV. 247 
(1999) (introducing the team-production model); Lynn A. Stout, Bad and Not-So-
Bad Arguments for Shareholder Primacy, 75 S. CAL. L. REV. 1189 (2002) (discuss-
ing the shortcomings of arguments favoring shareholder primacy). 
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roots in Jensen and Meckling’s (J-M) principal-agent model4 
and considering de novo the model’s implications for corporate 
law.5  Key to understanding these implications is a neglected 
feature of the J-M model: its narrow partial equilibrium frame-
work.  Partial equilibrium models deal with one market at a 
time, taking the market in isolation in determining the equilib-
rium outcome.  More prosaically, these models proceed on the 
key assumption that all “other things [are] equal.”6  The J-M 
analysis thus assumes that management moral hazard is the 
firm’s only unsolved problem and then applies market control 
to minimize the resulting agency costs.  In the model’s frame-
work of reference, agency cost reduction, and hence greater 
shareholder influence, always enhances efficiency because all 
other things are assumed to be not only equal but efficient. 
Results produced in partial equilibrium analyses, however, 
tend to vary with the “details” of the model—i.e., with the 
model’s assumed variables of interest and the mode of explor-
ing the variables’ behavior in an environment in which all other 
variables are kept fixed.  Under the assumption that manage-
ment moral hazard is the firm’s sole problem, models in the J-
M line depict market shareholders as having better-aligned in-
centives than managers and then automatically attach efficient 
consequences to shareholder governance.  But there is another 
line of partial equilibrium analysis—models of management 
“myopia”7—which sends a contrary signal.  Here the locus of 
imperfection shifts from management moral hazard to the 
asymmetric information problem bound up in the fact that 
market shareholders know less about the business than do its 
managers.  On this different assumption, these models show 
4 See generally Michael C. Jensen & William H. Meckling, Theory of the Firm: 
Managerial Behavior, Agency Costs and Ownership Structure, 3 J. FIN. ECON. 305 
(1976) (introducing the concept of agency costs and positing a nexus of contracts 
theory of the firm); see also section I.B.1 (discussing the J-M model). 
5 The original arbitrage came from Easterbrook and Fischel, who expanded 
the model. See generally FRANK H. EASTERBROOK & DANIEL R. FISCHEL, THE ECONOMIC 
STRUCTURE OF CORPORATE LAW (1991) (restating J-M in a legal framework); see also 
section I.B.2 (discussing contractarianism). 
6 See ROSS M. STARR, GENERAL EQUILIBRIUM THEORY: AN INTRODUCTION 3 (2d ed. 
2011). 
7 See Jeremy C. Stein, Efficient Capital Markets, Inefficient Firms: A Model of 
Myopic Corporate Behavior, 104 Q.J. ECON. 655, 667 (1989) [hereinafter Stein, 
Efficient Capital Markets] (modeling suboptimal investment where managers max-
imize a weighted average of near-term stock prices and long-run value); Jeremy C. 
Stein, Takeover Threats and Managerial Myopia, 96 J. POL. ECON. 61, 63–67 
(1988) [hereinafter Stein, Takeover Threats] (showing formally that, even absent 
agency costs, managers of the firm threatened by a takeover will sell an under-
priced asset). 
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formally that inefficiencies result under greater shareholder 
influence. 
How then can we decide which model is “right” when con-
fronted with opposite results, as in the case of the J-M and 
myopia models?  The answer is that we cannot.  Both sets of 
models should be seen as useful examples which can highlight 
logical shortcomings in normative arguments.  But neither can 
provide the basis for a more general theory with normative 
implications for corporate governance.  This is the infirmity at 
the core of corporate legal theory: it takes J-M’s brilliant exam-
ple8 and deploys it as a normative theory. 
This Article’s introduction of general equilibrium theory to 
corporate governance seeks to remedy this infirmity.  Unlike in 
partial equilibrium analysis, in a general equilibrium frame-
work the equilibrium concept sweeps in all markets simultane-
ously and incorporates their interactions.9  Methodologically, 
GE looks at the economy as a closed and interrelated system, 
simultaneously determining the equilibrium values of all vari-
ables of interest in all markets.  Further, because all relevant 
variables are considered as endogenous, a change in one varia-
ble always results in re-computation of all other variables.10 
This explains why GE can aspire to normative implications 
where a partial equilibrium model cannot. 
At this point, we anticipate an irrelevance objection.  This 
posits that there is such a thing as a theory that is too high— 
too mathematical and too complicated (GE is both)—to provide 
a robust basis for real world policymaking.  That is why law and 
economics, whose job it is to apply microeconomic theory in an 
imperfect world where things need to get done, avoids con-
fronting GE and instead draws on simpler partial equilibrium 
models for inspiration.  The answer to this objection is that, 
given the rise of empowered shareholders it is no longer pru-
dent or sensible to ignore GE’s microeconomics of markets. 
Shareholder empowerment substantially increases the magni-
tude of market control of business decision-making, holding 
out cognizable possibilities of perverse results.  Mainstream 
corporate legal theory lacks the tools to conceptualize these 
possibilities.  Things were different during the era of separated 
8 Corporate legal theory largely ignored myopia models until the financial 
crisis of 2007–2008. See William W. Bratton & Michael L. Wachter, The Eclipse of 
the Shareholder Paradigm 56 (Jan. 15, 2015) (unpublished manuscript) (on file 
with authors). 
9 STARR, supra note 6, at 5. 
10 ANDREU  MAS-COLELL, MICHAEL D. WHINSTON & JERRY R. GREEN, 
MICROECONOMIC THEORY 511 (1995). 
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ownership and control, when unchecked management power 
was indeed the salient governance problem.  In that context, 
the economics of agency adequately addressed the policy task 
at hand.  Today we have a different, more complex practice 
picture with which to grapple.  To do so adequately we need to 
reframe corporate legal theory by reference to GE’s more sub-
stantial theory of prices and markets. 
Reference to GE yields three crucial lessons.  The first con-
cerns the widely held assumption that economic theory in-
structs us that consumer surplus is maximized when 
competitive markets guide production.  GE shows that this as-
sumption is unfounded unless one also assumes complete mar-
kets, as did Arrow and Debreu in the first and fundamental GE 
model of the economy.11  Complete markets imply a world 
where everything can be traded and parties can deal with un-
certainty by insuring their preferences in advance, almost as if 
uncertainty did not exist.12  A reasonable observer quickly will 
conclude, however, that markets are, in fact, not complete. 
Once this reality is factored in, GE shows that market control 
yields inefficient results. 
The second lesson follows when one brings GE models of 
business decision-making by shareholders to corporate legal 
theory.  The models yield a picture of distorted incentives due 
to market incompleteness, with the shareholders making pro-
duction decisions based on idiosyncratic consumption prefer-
ences rather than fundamental value.13  GE models also show 
uncertainty undermining market pricing accuracy, results that 
are replicated by contemporary asset pricing theory.14  The two 
results completely undercut corporate law’s prevailing market 
control paradigm.  Microeconomics teaches that it is not safe to 
assume that agency cost reduction stemming from the share-
holder power shift maximizes value.  It instead situates us in a 
world with a two-sided incentive problem, one concerning man-
agers and already well-traversed in corporate legal theory and 
11 ´See GERARD DEBREU, THEORY OF VALUE: AN AXIOMATIC ANALYSIS OF ECONOMIC 
EQUILIBRIUM 98–102 (1959); Kenneth J. Arrow & Gérard Debreu, Existence of an 
Equilibrium for a Competitive Economy, 22 ECONOMETRICA  265 (1954).  The opera-
tive Walrasian mathematics were worked out in Gérard Debreu, A Social Equilib-
rium Existence Theorem, 38 PROC. NAT’L  ACAD. SCI. 886 (1952). See also infra 
subpart II.B (discussing the A-D model in detail). 
12 YVAN  LENGWILER, MICROFOUNDATIONS OF  FINANCIAL  ECONOMICS: AN  INTRODUC-
TION TO GENERAL EQUILIBRIUM ASSET PRICING 20 (2004). 
13 See infra section III.B.1. 
14 See infra subpart III.C. 
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the other concerning shareholders and only beginning to be 
acknowledged, much less studied. 
The third lesson is negative, for GE does not tell us how 
optimally to address the two-sided problem of agency costs and 
market inefficiency.  The shift of decision-making power to 
shareholders transforms the corporation into a hybrid form 
that straddles the firm and the markets.  As yet no general 
economic theory tells us the best way to structure this hybrid 
corporate form.  Indeed, economic theory does not even offer 
any useful presumptions.  While the microeconomics of incen-
tives shows (in partial equilibrium examples) that agency cost 
reduction enhances firm value, GE denudes the assertion of 
normative salience when it shows that shareholder business 
decision-making can produce suboptimal results.  At the same 
time, while GE models could appear to support a policy pre-
sumption against shareholder empowerment, a closer look 
teaches a different lesson.  Management moral hazard remains 
in the GE’s picture as a source of market incompleteness, thus 
blocking any antishareholder or promanagement 
presumptions. 
We walk away from these lessons with two policy recom-
mendations and a novel economic justification of Delaware’s 
system of judicial decision-making.  The first recommendation 
suggests a moratorium on policy proposals favoring either mar-
ket control or management insulation.  While GE’s ultimate 
normative teaching is negative, it is by no means irrelevant for 
it implies a presumption that proposals for either market con-
trol or for management insulation lack support in economic 
theory and have distortionary effects in practice.  This lesson 
by itself has radical implications for corporate legal theory. 
A second recommendation follows from this cautionary 
policy outcome, one that restates and updates the old pre-
sumption favoring private ordering in corporate governance. 
Economic theory counsels that in an imperfect world off-mar-
ket contracting that directs incentives in the proper direction 
offers a more promising route to productive efficiency than 
does market control.  More promising but not necessarily effi-
cient: in bargaining theory, the party with bargaining power 
controls the result whether or not the outcome is optimal.  It 
follows that the possibility of contracting does not preclude 
suboptimal outcomes, as it cannot rule out the opportunistic 
abuse of bargaining power by either managers or empowered 
shareholders.  Today’s challenge for corporate law is thus to 
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avoid distortionary dominance of the bargaining process by 
either contracting party. 
We also make a prediction: corporate law, as interpreted 
and enforced in Delaware, is well-positioned to face the chal-
lenges posed by the hybrid corporation.  Delaware courts have 
never imposed maximizing directives based on economic the-
ory.  They instead leave the basic alignment of the parties’ enti-
tlements to the parties’ own bargaining process and address 
problems that arise in the course of events through a pragmatic 
process of equitable adjudication.  As equity adjudicators, the 
Delaware chancellors have wide latitude to mold earlier deci-
sions to fit new facts and thereby adapt the law to ever-chang-
ing economic circumstances and legal relationships.15  In light 
of the results of our analysis, we think this flexible approach 
can be characterized as economically astute.  Of course, eq-
uity’s flexibility leaves room for residual indeterminacy.  But, in 
the case of Delaware law, this indeterminacy should be wel-
comed as the consequentialist legal response to GE’s indeter-
minate results.  GE fails to tell us how to trade off managerial 
opportunism (agency costs) against shareholder opportunism 
(market inefficiency) because the relative costs and benefits 
cannot be determined ex ante.  But if there is no template for 
future forms of opportunism, then judging cannot follow from 
rigid rules.  Ex-post discretion to address case-specific facts is 
required instead.  Delaware’s equity system ensures that its 
adjudicators possess the requisite skills. 
The rest of the Article proceeds as follows.  Part I describes 
the evolution of corporate legal theory and its changing an-
swers to the question of the relative merits of hierarchies and 
markets.  It starts with the hierarchical view of the corporation 
of the mid-twentieth century, then moves to the 1980s import 
of the J-M agency model through the contractarian theory of 
Easterbrook and Fischel, and closes with the rise of the now 
dominant market control paradigm.  Part II introduces GE to 
corporate governance for the first time, starting at square one 
with the first and second theorems of welfare economics and 
the distinction between partial and general equilibrium analy-
sis.  It then goes on to describe the evolution of GE, from the 
Arrow-Debreu model and its assumption-laden picture of mar-
ket success to the conclusion that markets fail to coordinate 
the economy efficiently due to market incompleteness.  Part III 
discusses GE’s implications for the positive model of the firm 
15 William T. Allen, A Bicentennial Toast to the Delaware Court of Chancery 
1792–1992, 48 BUS. LAW. 363, 365 (1992). 
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and the rise of shareholder empowerment, showing how GE 
helps to explain particulars of the legal corporate form and 
describing GE’s prediction that shareholder participation in 
business planning will lead to suboptimal results.  Lastly, Part 
IV explores the legal ramifications of our analysis, looking first 
at the normative message of GE for current corporate govern-
ance, then formulating policy recommendations for corporate 
legal theory, and finally considering corporate law as inter-
preted and enforced in Delaware. 
I 
MANAGEMENT POWER AND MARKET CONTROL 
The theories that inform corporate law have evolved over 
time in response to events.  We accordingly present our case for 
paradigmatic revision of the market control paradigm as a les-
son of history, reviewing the successive responses that corpo-
rate legal theory has provided to the question of the relative 
merits of hierarchies and markets in coordinating corporate 
production. 
We begin, in subpart I.A, with the mid-twentieth century 
consensus description of large corporations as management-
dominated hierarchies that operate outside of markets.  Sub-
part I.B takes up the neoclassical reversal of this position that 
began in the 1970s, when Jensen and Meckling’s principal-
agent model16 was unpacked and expanded in the contractari-
anism of Easterbrook and Fischel,17 resulting in the assertion 
that markets and contracts could solve all problems addressed 
in corporate law.  Subpart I.C explains how the neoclassical 
market success story was subsequently transformed into a law 
reform story when the disappearance of the primary market 
control mechanism, the hostile takeover, was attributed to reg-
ulatory interference.  The economics of agency were then redi-
rected into a regulatory program to reinstate market control 
through shareholder empowerment.  The advent of empowered 
shareholders finally brings this about, albeit as the result of 
changes in the pattern of shareholding and the rise of activist 
hedge funds rather than from regulatory intervention. 
16 See Jensen & Meckling, supra note 4. 
17 See generally EASTERBROOK & FISCHEL, supra note 5 (discussing Jensen and 
Meckling’s principal-agent model in the context of contractarianism). 
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A. Hierarchies Outside of Markets 
When observers looked at big companies during the mid-
twentieth century, they saw empowered hierarchs.  Most 
agreed that management power ineluctably flowed from organi-
zational expertise and that structural impediments foreclosed 
the possibility of putting hierarchical firms under market con-
trol.18  Markets were seen as intrinsically incapable of provid-
ing an environment conducive to complex production.19 
Moreover, based on the experience of the Great Depression, 
most people thought of markets as generally prone to fail. 
The leading description, Adolf Berle and Gardiner Means’s 
The Modern Corporation and Private Property, first published in 
1932, asserted that the modern corporate economy had super-
seded the classical, Smithian picture of a successfully self-
correcting market economy.20  The Berle and Means diagnosis 
implied an accountability problem and a regulatory response: if 
the forces of supply and demand could not regulate the deci-
sion-makers at the top of corporate hierarchies, government 
controls needed to be substituted both as regarded manage-
ment moral hazard and the coordination of production and 
pricing decisions with the interests of the wider economy.  By 
the end of World War II, many thought that New Deal reforms 
had satisfactorily ameliorated the accountability problem and 
achieved the requisite degree of coordination.21  Indeed, man-
agers came to enjoy great prestige as successful economic 
planners as the post-war economy expanded. 
Hierarchical thinking also found its way into 
microeconomics.  Ronald Coase integrated the classical eco-
nomic description and the hierarchical view of corporate pro-
18 See William W. Bratton, Jr., The “Nexus of Contracts” Corporation: A Criti-
cal Appraisal, 74 CORNELL L. REV. 407, 413 (1989). 
19 See, e.g., DENNIS  HOLME  ROBERTSON, THE  CONTROL OF  INDUSTRY 85 (1949) 
(viewing corporations not as extensions of markets but as “islands of conscious 
power in [the markets’] ocean of unconscious co-operation”). 
20 See ADOLF A. BERLE, JR. & GARDINER C. MEANS, THE MODERN CORPORATION AND 
PRIVATE PROPERTY 1, 45–46 (Macmillan reissue 1933) (noting that economic power 
had concentrated in the hands of corporate managers and that the corporate 
system amounted to a major social institution); see also MICHAEL MAGILL & MAR-
TINE QUINZII, THEORY OF INCOMPLETE MARKETS 425 (paperback ed. 2002) (describing 
Berle and Means as the founders of the economics of management moral hazard); 
Gardiner C. Means, Hessen’s Reappraisal, 26 J.L. & ECON. 297, 297 (1983) (show-
casing Means’s dissatisfaction with aspects of a colleague’s reappraisal of a previ-
ous joint work). 
21 ADOLF A. BERLE, THE  AMERICAN  ECONOMIC  REPUBLIC 82, 91, 99 (1963) 
(describing interdependence between the state and the economy, with the state 
taking ultimate responsibility and exercising the higher level of power but inter-
vening only to stabilize performance). 
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duction in a famous essay published in 1937.22  Coase drew a 
line between market coordination and production in firms.  He 
posited that if markets held out a framework conducive to com-
plex production, then actors could be expected to produce 
based on individual transactions in markets and firms would 
not exist.  But firms did exist and production occurred therein. 
For an explanation, Coase looked to transaction costs.  Produc-
tion through individual contracts would be too expensive.23 
Hierarchical structure reduces this cost, facilitating complex 
economic endeavor by turning coordination over to an 
entrepreneur.24 
B. The Neo-Classical Revolution 
Corporate legal theory turned away from hierarchies to a 
market-based description of large corporations in the century’s 
closing decades.  Things had changed.  The 1970s stagflation 
economy undermined confidence in both the management-
dominated corporate production system25 and the regulatory 
state.26  People were ready to return their trust to markets. 
Law and economics scholars assured them that improvements 
would follow—first through the introduction of the neoclassical 
agency cost model of Jensen and Meckling27 and, next, 
through Easterbrook and Fischel’s legal adaptation and expan-
sion of that model.28 
22 R.H. Coase, The Nature of the Firm, 4 ECONOMICA 386 (1937). 
23 Id. at 390–92 (arguing that organizing production through the price mech-
anism meant incurring the cost of ascertaining the prices and that long-term 
relationships would be difficult to sustain). 
24 Id. at 392. 
25 See THEODORE ROSENOF, ECONOMICS IN THE LONG RUN: NEW DEAL THEORISTS & 
THEIR LEGACIES, 1933–1993, at 3 (1997) (“Inflation became rampant and stagna-
tion reappeared, not in the form of a cataclysmic Great Depression but by way of 
minimal growth and sluggishness interrupted by bouts of severe recession and 
only brief, ephemeral leaps into semblances of a boom.”). 
26 GERALD F. DAVIS, THE  VANISHING  AMERICAN  CORPORATION: NAVIGATING THE 
HAZARDS OF A  NEW  ECONOMY 56 (2016); William W. Bratton, The Separation of 
Corporate Law and Social Welfare, 74 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 767, 773–75 (2017). 
27 The initial cross-reference occurred in Daniel R. Fischel, Efficient Capital 
Market Theory, the Market for Corporate Control, and the Regulation of Cash 
Tender Offers, 57 TEX. L. REV. 1, 8–9 (1978). 
28 See, e.g., Frank H. Easterbrook & Daniel R. Fischel, Close Corporations 
and Agency Costs, 38 STAN. L. REV. 271, 277–83 (1986) (noting that courts tend to 
defer to contractual agreements rather than legal rules); Frank H. Easterbrook & 
Daniel R. Fischel, The Corporate Contract, 89 COLUM. L. REV. 1416, 1426–28 
(1989) [hereinafter Easterbook & Fischel, Contract] (discussing what motivates a 
corporation to choose a particular corporate agreement); Frank H. Easterbrook & 
Daniel R. Fischel, Limited Liability and the Corporation, 52 U. CHI. L. REV. 89, 
94–96 (1985) (arguing that limited liability promotes managerial efficiency and 
lowers agency costs); Frank H. Easterbrook & Daniel R. Fischel, Optimal Damages 
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1. The Principal-Agent Model 
J-M’s principal-agent model tells a corporate creation story 
in which the only problem confronting the firm is management 
moral hazard, which causes agency costs.  In the model’s set 
up, but for management moral hazard and shareholders’ and 
managers’ arrangements in respect thereof, all other things are 
not only equal but efficient.29  Agency costs are reduced to the 
extent that managers find it cost effective to incur bonding 
costs and investors find it cost effective to incur monitoring 
costs.30  This does not mean that bonding, monitoring, and 
contracting will reduce agency costs to zero.  Instead, residual 
agency costs that cannot be cost effectively eliminated will per-
sist as an intrinsic production cost.31  This persistent resid-
uum, however, is unproblematic because, in the model, the 
equity trading market allocates residual agency costs to the 
founder-manager at the moment of creation.32 
The J-M model minimizes authority’s and hierarchy’s im-
portance in describing corporate production, redirecting atten-
tion to contract.  It deflects Coase’s description, making it 
possible to show that private ordering in capital markets works 
effectively in corporate governance, a private ordering com-
prised partly of market trading and partly of out-of-market ne-
gotiated contracting.33  But the model is also assumption-
laden.  The only operative factors are (1) a conflict of interest 
between managers and shareholders arising from the man-
ager’s rational incentive to self-serve, (2) the manager’s and 
shareholder’s ability to contract with respect thereto, and (3) 
the stock market’s ability to price out the conflict.  Separation 
in Securities Cases, 52 U. CHI. L. REV. 611, 615–18 (1985) (discussing the imple-
mentation of economically efficient legal rules in the realm of securities law). 
29 For exposition of the operation of and limitations on partial equilibrium 
models, such as the J-M model, see infra subpart II.A. 
30 Jensen & Meckling, supra note 4, at 323–26. 
31 Id. at 327–28. 
32 Id. at 313–14, 318–19. 
33 More particularly, market trading prices management moral hazard and 
allocates its cost; meanwhile, private contracting obviates any need for state 
intervention in internal corporate affairs in cases where markets do not work. 
Authority structures in firms do not disappear.  J-M instead change the charac-
terization of what it means to be a hierarchical inferior.  For Coase, this implied a 
sacrifice of liberty that required explanation.  For J-M, the hierarchical inferior is 
a contract counterparty who can always walk away. Id. at 310–11.  J-M here 
repeat a point made earlier by Alchian and Demsetz. See Armen A. Alchian & 
Harold Demsetz, Production, Information Costs, and Economic Organization, 62 
AM. ECON. REV. 777, 777 (1972) (firms have “no power of fiat, no authority, no 
disciplinary action,” not differing “in the slightest degree, from ordinary market 
contracting between any two people”). 
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of ownership and control,34 shareholder votes,35 and hostile 
takeovers36 are left over for future inquiry, along with every 
other problem addressed in corporate governance, not to men-
tion the matter of corporate interaction with exterior actors and 
product markets.  The J-M model, in effect, held out a blank 
canvas on which legal theorists could paint in a thicker 
description. 
2. Contractarianism 
Easterbrook and Fischel (E-F) filled in the canvas, turning 
what is implicit in J-M into a sequence of normative asser-
tions.37  They quietly relaxed J-M’s limiting assumptions so 
that the model accommodated the real world’s corporate gov-
ernance framework without needing significant modification. 
At the bottom line came a radical assertion: between markets 
and contracts, the main problems addressed in corporate law 
were already being solved. 
In E-F’s transformation of J-M, the “contract” is not just 
the result of face-to-face bargaining at the moment the public 
firm is created through an IPO, but corporate law itself and 
internal corporate legislation (charters and bylaws) enacted 
over time.  This “contractarian” restatement also expands the 
set of market controls of agency costs.  In addition to stock 
market pricing, the accuracy of which is deemed assured by 
the efficient market hypothesis of financial economics (EMH),38 
E-F rely on three additional sources of market control—hostile 
takeovers (called the “market for corporate control”), the mar-
ket for the firm’s products, and the executive labor market. 
34 Jensen & Meckling, supra note 4, at 356 (“One of the most serious limita-
tion [sic] of the analysis is that as it stands we have not worked out in this paper 
its application to the very large modern corporation whose managers own little or 
no equity.”). 
35 Id. at 314 (assuming the stock sold at the moment of origin is nonvoting). 
36 See id. (assuming that absent voting stock, a hostile takeover is 
impossible). 
37 Easterbrook & Fischel, Contract, supra note 28, at 1426–31. 
38 Markets would be “strong form” efficient if they priced in all information, 
material nonpublic information as well as all public information.  It is, however, 
generally accepted that financial markets are not strong form efficient. See STE-
PHEN A. ROSS ET AL., CORPORATE FINANCE 359 (6th ed. 2002).  In contrast, the EMH’s 
“semi-strong” form is generally accepted.  This, sometimes called “informational 
efficiency,” posits that the capital markets embed all publicly available informa-
tion into security prices. See Burton G. Malkiel, Efficient Market Hypothesis, in 1 
THE NEW PALGRAVE DICTIONARY OF MONEY AND FINANCE 739, 739 (Peter Newman et al. 
eds., 1992). 
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The four markets operate together to assure agency cost mini-
mization on a multiperiod basis, just as J-M predicted.39 
Two broad claims about corporate law follow.  First, there 
should be a presumption against having any more corporate 
law than already exists.  Because rational actors arrange gov-
ernance in contracts and markets price the contract terms, 
legal mandates are justifiable only in the unlikely event that 
“the terms chosen by firms are both unpriced and systemati-
cally perverse from investors’ standpoints.”40  Second, the in-
herited corporate law regime is economically rational,41 
justifying a strong normative presumption in its favor. 
E-F’s intervention triggered intense debate, a debate that 
proceeded against the background of a practice shock—the 
hostile takeover boom of the 1980s.  The boom, widely seen as 
a corrective of deficient management performance, was per-
fectly timed to import credibility to contractarianism.  E-F, by 
folding the market for corporate control into J-M’s moral haz-
ard account, produced a neat explanation of what was going on 
in the real world: moral hazard had caused agency costs to run 
to excess and discounted stock prices reflected the value im-
pairment.  The discounts in turn attracted control bidders by 
assuring an arbitrage profit, with the market-based control 
transfer performing a critical agency cost reductive role.42 
39 EASTERBROOK & FISCHEL, supra note 5, at 4–5, 18–21, 91, 93, 96–97.  The 
market for corporate control originated with Henry Manne but had no connection 
to hostile takeovers in Manne’s articulation. See Henry G. Manne, Mergers and 
the Market for Corporate Control, 73 J. POL. ECON. 110, 110, 112–13, 118, 119 
(1965) (describing a market for corporate control and proposing that, absent 
regulation, stock price declines would trigger disciplinary friendly mergers). 
Manne changed his view later. See Henry G. Manne, A Free Market Model of a 
Large Corporate System, 52 EMORY L.J. 1381, 1388–89 (2003).  We also note that 
reliance on a market triad (control, product, and employment) to control manage-
ment does antedate Easterbrook and Fischel’s arbitrage of J-M.  Ralph K. Winter, 
Jr., State Law, Shareholder Protection, and the Theory of the Corporation, 6 J. LEG. 
STUD. 251, 262–70 (1977). 
40 EASTERBROOK & FISCHEL, supra note 5, at 21.  Easterbrook and Fischel 
make a strong claim for institutional primacy for the market price without also 
making a claim for strong form market price efficiency. Id. at 18–19. 
41 Id. at 315. 
42 Viewed retrospectively, J-M’s moral hazard account is unlikely to be satis-
factory as a standalone explanation for 1980s takeovers—today’s empirical profile 
holds out a much richer collection of causative factors. See, e.g., Robert Com-
ment & G. William Schwert, Poison or Placebo? Evidence on the Deterrence and 
Wealth Effects of Modern Antitakeover Measures, 39 J. FIN. ECON. 3, 10–18 (1995) 
(looking at a range of factors to see whether any consistently predict that a firm 
will become a hostile target and finding that only size proves a consistently suc-
cessful predictor); Mark L. Mitchell & J. Harold Mulherin, The Impact of Industry 
Shocks on Takeover and Restructuring Activity, 41 J. FIN. ECON. 193, 194–96 
(1996) (showing that mergers come in waves and focus on specific industries). 
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E-F’s arbitrage never gained ascendance in all particulars, 
however.  The sticking point was the capacious notion of con-
tract,43 which encompasses all interaction between managers, 
investors, consumers, and the government in a multiperiod, 
dynamic setting that featured few actual negotiations44 even as 
it promised efficient results.  But even partial acceptance im-
plied fundamental changes in the way people viewed corporate 
law.  Henceforth, policy discussions would proceed in a 
microeconomic framework dominated by two normative pre-
sumptions—one presumption disfavoring new regulatory ini-
tiatives and one favoring market control. 
C. The Market Control Paradigm 
1. Market Control 
Hostile takeovers changed the way people viewed corpora-
tions, but they disappeared in the wake of the 1989 economic 
collapse.  A public choice story circulated to explain the hostile 
takeover’s disappearance.  Managers seeking renewed insula-
tion from the markets had gone to state legislatures and ap-
pealed to state judiciaries to promote antitakeover statutes and 
otherwise validate takeover defensive measures.45  It followed 
that in the post-takeover era agency costs were chronically and 
suboptimally high. 
A reformulation of the contractarian paradigm naturally 
followed.  The new formulation retained the principal-agent 
43 See Easterbrook & Fischel, Contract, supra note 28, at 1428–34. 
44 Legal notions of contract could not be stretched far enough to support the 
E-F characterization.  The more particular question was whether the territory of 
“contract,” with its arm’s length bargains and equally situated parties, plausibly 
covered the entire ground swept in by the contractarian firm, much of which was 
apparently hierarchical in character.  The consensus answer was that contractual 
characterization was insufficiently robust to justify turning all of corporate law 
into a default regime—fiduciary duties would have to remain mandatory because 
proxy voting was not a process context suited to effective noncompetitive trans-
acting. See generally John C. Coffee, Jr., No Exit?: Opting Out, the Contractual 
Theory of the Corporation, and the Special Case of Remedies, 53 BROOK. L. REV. 
919 (1988) (criticizing the nexus of contracts theory of the firm); John C. Coffee, 
Jr., The Mandatory/Enabling Balance in Corporate Law: An Essay on the Judicial 
Role, 89 COLUM. L. REV. 1618 (1989) (same); Melvin Aron Eisenberg, The Structure 
of Corporation Law, 89 COLUM. L. REV. 1461 (1989) (same); Jeffrey N. Gordon, The 
Mandatory Structure of Corporate Law, 89 COLUM. L. REV. 1549 (1989) (same). 
45 See Roberta Romano, The Future of Hostile Takeovers: Legislation and 
Public Opinion, 57 U. CIN. L. REV. 457, 458–65 (1988).  Since the seminal 1985 
decision in Moran v. Household International, Inc., Delaware courts have tilted 
decidedly toward upholding the primacy of directorial power in deciding whether a 
takeover bid should move forward. See Moran v. Household Int’l, Inc., 500 A.2d 
1346, 1351 (Del. 1985) (allowing company board of directors to adopt takeover 
defense mechanisms). 
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model’s exclusive focus on management moral hazard along 
with an information-efficient account of stock market pricing. 
But now, instead of a contracting field conducive to efficient 
self-correction as predicted by E-F, we had a field riven with 
collective action problems, path dependencies, and other fail-
ures.46  Regulation came back into the picture as a result, but 
for the limited purpose of adjusting the process framework so 
that market control of management conduct could work in fact. 
Corporate governance needed positive law reforms directed to 
shareholder empowerment so as finally to get us to the equilib-
rium posited at the start by J-M.47  Henceforth, the sharehold-
ers should have “ultimate control” of the firm.48  We call this 
sequence of assertions the “market control” paradigm. 
Market control meant removal of antitakeover barriers, but 
that was not politically feasible.  The policy agenda accordingly 
looked toward “shareholder empowerment” more generally. 
Management needed to be forced to yield to shareholder inputs 
on governance and business planning on a going concern ba-
sis.  Incentive alignment was the reason.  Where managers’ in-
centives were compromised and suspect, shareholders had a 
pure financial incentive to maximize value, and thus provided 
the only unsullied planning inputs.49  That information asym-
metries might impair the quality of any shareholder inputs was 
not deemed to be a salient problem, for a market-based per-
formance metric was available—the stock price.50 
2. Shareholder Empowerment 
Shareholder empowerment finally came about after the 
turn of this century, not through law reform but through an-
other practice shock—the massive reconcentration of corporate 
46 See, e.g., Mark J. Roe, Commentary, Chaos and Evolution in Law and 
Economics, 109 HARV. L. REV. 641, 644–45 (1996) (“The United States developed 
corporate structures with strong managers and weak owners . . . partly due to 
path dependence.”); see also Lucian Arye Bebchuk & Mark J. Roe, A Theory of 
Path Dependence in Corporate Ownership and Governance, 52 STAN. L. REV. 127, 
129 (1999) (“Because of this path dependence, a country’s pattern of ownership 
structures at any point in time depends partly on the patterns it had earlier.”). 
47 See, e.g., Lucian Arye Bebchuk, The Case for Increasing Shareholder 
Power, 118 HARV. L. REV. 833, 865–70 (2005) (recommending expansion of share-
holder legislative access to the corporate charter and the state of incorporation 
decision); Lucian Arye Bebchuk, The Myth of the Shareholder Franchise, 93 VA. L. 
Rev. 675, 699–702 (2007) (recommending a right to replace all incumbents every 
two or three years). 
48 Henry Hansmann & Reinier Kraakman, The End of History for Corporate 
Law, 89 GEO. L.J. 439, 440–41 (2001). 
49 Id. at 449. 
50 Id. at 440–41. 
\\jciprod01\productn\C\CRN\105-3\CRN304.txt unknown Seq: 17  3-AUG-20 14:14
691 2020] CORPORATE LAW 
ownership and the rise of activist hedge funds.  Some observers 
resist the notion that this change is fundamental, arguing that 
excess management agency costs continue to present a press-
ing policy problem.51  Others describe a difference in kind.  Gil-
son and Gordon observe that the separation of ownership and 
control has disappeared because shareholders now value (and 
exercise) their franchise to shape business policy.52  Activist 
investors are the transmission mechanism through which dis-
persed shareholder register their planning preferences.53  Thus 
do market forces now determine planning outcomes even 
though the infrastructure of corporate governance remains 
unchanged. 
Gilson and Gordon have the better view.  With shareholder 
empowerment, market prices set by anonymous trading share-
holders determine the firm’s business plan on a going concern 
basis, subordinating management.  This is a fundamental 
break with the hierarchical model of the corporation, a break 
sharper and more fundamental even than that held out by 
takeover-centric governance.  The takeovers of the 1980s cer-
tainly did inject capital market inputs into production deci-
sions.  But corporate hierarchies were not displaced as a 
result.54  Takeovers meant leveraged restructuring, which 
tended to be followed by asset sales and cost-cutting.  The 
most effective defense was a voluntary, preemptive leveraged 
restructuring, usually in the form of a private equity buyout. 
Whether restructuring followed from a hostile takeover or de-
fensive buyout, it was an all-or-nothing, one-time-only event 
involving control transfer.  If the transfer was hostile, an old 
51 See Lucian A. Bebchuk, The Myth that Insulating Boards Serves Long-Term 
Value, 113 COLUM. L. REV. 1637, 1651 (2013); Mark J. Roe, Corporate Short-
Termism—In the Boardroom and in the Courtroom, 68 BUS. LAW. 978, 1006 (2013). 
52 Ronald J. Gilson & Jeffrey N. Gordon, The Agency Costs of Agency Capital-
ism: Activist Investors and the Revaluation of Governance Rights, 113 COLUM. L. 
REV. 863, 865, 867, 874 (2013). Governance rights, formerly devalued, now are 
employed for the purpose of value enhancement as the hedge funds use them in 
tandem with firm-specific informational investment and monitoring. Id. at 891. 
53 Id. at 867 (insisting that the hedge funds’ appearance “should be seen as 
an endogenous response to the monitoring shortfall that follows from ownership 
reconcentration in intermediary institutions”). 
54 See Bengt Holmstrom & Steven N. Kaplan, Corporate Governance and 
Merger Activity in the United States: Making Sense of the 1980s and 1990s, 15 J. 
ECON. PERSP. 121, 122–23, 137 (2001) (depicting the takeover wars as a one-time 
only reaction to an external shock caused by economic factors such as deregula-
tion, globalization, and new information and communications technologies, with 
financial markets showing a temporary comparative advantage over management 
in undertaking the structural adjustments made necessary by the changes but 
not necessarily a permanent shift of the locus of production decision-making from 
within the firm to outside markets). 
\\jciprod01\productn\C\CRN\105-3\CRN304.txt unknown Seq: 18  3-AUG-20 14:14
692 CORNELL LAW REVIEW [Vol. 105:675 
“entrepreneur” was replaced by a new one; if the transfer was 
voluntary and defensive, no replacement occurred.  Either way, 
the manager of the restructured firm made production deci-
sions independently from the price system, albeit often from a 
situation of enhanced constraint due to a debt burden.55 
Activist interventions are thought to be smaller in size and 
less threatening than were hostile tender offers.  A control 
change is rarely implicated, with the activist working with the 
present team rather than throwing it out.  But a larger threat 
lurks behind the smaller numbers.  As the cost of engagement 
falls, the numbers of both hostile intervenors and actual and 
potential targets expand.  The business planning threat be-
comes generalized.  To make this point more clearly, we apply 
a game theoretic gloss to the fact pattern.  We begin this 
description by distinguishing between two different kinds of 
market influence over production decisions in the new era.  In 
the first, no activist has appeared but intervention is 
threatened; in the second, activist intervention has occurred. 
Case 1: Investors are not yet active.  In this case, the manager 
knows that if she “disappoints” the market, an activist will 
show up and likely behave in an antagonistic manner— 
whether by advancing shareholder proposals, by publicly 
criticizing the company and demanding change, or by threat-
ening to wage a proxy fight in order to gain board representa-
tion.  Failure to reach an agreement with the activist means 
that the proxy fight will materialize.  (Takeover bids are some-
times threatened but rarely seen in practice.56)  Most such 
contests result in activist success.  As a result, rational man-
agers will anticipate the activists’ demands and make the 
production decision the market prefers.  For example, if ac-
tivists demand (on average) a lower level of research and 
development and capital expenditure along with increased 
leverage, managers will amend production and financing pol-
icy accordingly. 
Case 2: Activist intervention. In this case, the market, or, 
more specifically, a hedge fund as representative of the mar-
ket, itself makes production decisions.  Indeed, the arrival of 
55 Significantly, constraining super-high leverage did not persist as a busi-
ness norm.  Post-takeover era leverage levels were higher than pre-takeover levels 
but not so high as to denude management of discretion to reinvest free cash flows. 
Id. at 127–32, 136–37. 
56 There is no question that activism prompts mergers, but the acquirer is 
almost always a third party. See, e.g., Nicole M. Boyson, Nickolay Gantchev & 
Anil Shivdasani, Activism Mergers, 126 J. FIN. ECON. 54, 58–59 (2017) (showing a 
takeover bid occurring in 24 percent of the engagements—from third parties in 
19.9 percent and from the activist itself in 3.4 percent). 
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an activist typically results in a negotiated settlement pursu-
ant to which management either makes concrete business 
concessions or agrees to put the activist’s representatives on 
the board.57 
In both Case 1 and Case 2 (although with different inten-
sity) acceding to the preferences of the potential or present 
activists reduces the manager’s risk of removal or diminished 
influence.  Borrowing from game theory, the situation can be 
characterized as an extensive game in which the manager plays 
first (by choosing the production plan) and the investors play 
second (by choosing whether or not to intervene).  In this 
game, there is only one equilibrium, one in which the manager 
chooses the investment plan the market likes so that the inves-
tors remain inactive.  That is, the manager anticipates and 
adopts the market’s preference, effectively putting the market 
in charge of production decisions.58 
Of course, actions out of the equilibrium path are possible. 
Some managers will resist by simply failing to take preemptive 
steps.  More likely, managers who believe their business plans 
to be robust but who fear a negative market response will take 
proactive and defensive steps to garner support by institutional 
investors.  This is called “shareholder engagement.”59  Yet the 
point of our stylized representation of an equilibrium path in 
which concession is the only rational course remains, and it 
underscores the magnitude of the power shift.  Authority over 
corporate affairs has shifted away from the board of directors to 
57 William W. Bratton, Hedge Funds and Governance Targets, 95 GEO. L.J. 
1375, 1402–08 (2007). 
58 Management concession to the demands of activist hedge funds can be 
framed as a subgame perfect equilibrium (SPE).  SPE is the concept that restricts 
the number of (Nash) equilibria that may result in a strategic-form game (that is, a 
game represented with matrices). See generally MICHAEL MASCHLER ET AL., GAME 
THEORY 252–57 (2103) (analytically treating SPE as a refinement of equilibrium in 
extensive-form games); ROGER B. MYERSON, GAME  THEORY: ANALYSIS OF  CONFLICT 
183–85 (1991) (same). 
59 Large institutional investors like BlackRock and Vanguard, which profess 
an interest in promoting long-term investment, insist that CEOs make direct 
contact and explain their strategies. See, e.g., SULLIVAN & CROMWELL LLP, 2016 
U.S. SHAREHOLDER  ACTIVISM  REVIEW AND  ANALYSIS 4–6 (Nov. 28, 2016), https:// 
www.sullcrom.com/2016-us-shareholder-activism-review-and-analysis-activ-
ists-face-headwinds-in-2016 [https://perma.cc/3VLJ-76FN] (describing efforts 
by Blackrock, Vanguard, and other large institutional investors to encourage 
companies engage them directly).  While cooperatively disposed, these investors 
also use the threat of intervention to bring themselves into the corporate decision-
making process on a going concern basis, with the justificatory burden falling on 
the managers in tandem with the burden to garner affirmative shareholder 
support. 
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the investors themselves, while the insulated hierarchy of the 
mid-twentieth century is finally eclipsed in practice. 
II 
MARKET COORDINATION UNDER GENERAL EQUILIBRIUM 
THEORY 
Under the market control paradigm, shareholder empower-
ment is a good thing because it reduces agency costs and gives 
properly incentivized actors a determinative role in business 
planning.  Shareholder control enhances productivity because 
the directives are market driven, and markets are intrinsically 
superior to institutions as coordinators of production.60  This 
is the majority view. 
A minority argues for a more cautious approach, raising 
the possibility of negative trade-offs and asking pointed ques-
tions about the newly empowered shareholders’ incentives and 
the reliability of the market mechanisms through which their 
interventions are channelled.61  These objections and ques-
tions tend to be dismissed as expedient, following not from 
economic theory but from either of two parochial agendas.  One 
is refractory managerialism—the objectors pursue the manage-
ment agenda and ultimately seek legislative interventions that 
would cut off the channels facilitating shareholder intervention 
much as did antitakeover legislation a generation ago.62  Alter-
natively, the objections are dismissed as a progressive ploy. 
The hidden objective is the displacement of shareholder value 
maximization as the corporate objective by a stakeholder 
model, with redistribution rather than productivity as the true 
motivation.63 
In fact, the objections have a powerful grounding in eco-
nomic theory whatever their proponents’ political coloration. 
But the objections’ theoretical legitimacy goes unrecognized be-
60 See Gilson & Gordon, supra note 52, at 865, 874. 
61 Anabtawi & Stout, supra note 3, at 1283–92; William W. Bratton & Michael 
L. Wachter, The Case Against Shareholder Empowerment, 158 U. PA. L. REV. 653, 
677–78 (2010); K.J. Martijn Cremers & Simone M. Sepe, The Shareholder Value of 
Empowered Boards, 68 STAN. L. REV. 67, 135–40 (2016); Zohar Goshen & Richard 
Squire, Principal Costs: A New Theory for Corporate Law and Governance, 117 
COLUM. L. REV. 767, 778–85 (2017); Lynn A. Stout, Do Antitakeover Defenses 
Decrease Shareholder Wealth?: The Ex Post/Ex Ante Valuation Problem, 55 STAN. 
L. REV. 845, 847–56 (2002); Lynn A. Stout, The Corporation as Time Machine: 
Intergenerational Equity, Intergenerational Efficiency, and the Corporate Form, 38 
SEATTLE U. L. REV. 685, 718–21 (2015). 
62 See Bebchuk, supra note 51; Roe, supra note 51, at 1003–04. 
63 J.B. Heaton, The “Long Term” in Corporate Law, 72 BUS. LAW. 353, 364–65 
(2017). 
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cause the supporting line of economics—general equilibrium 
theory—has never successfully undergone an interdisciplinary 
transfer from microeconomics to law and economics and corpo-
rate legal theory.  A second dose of theoretical instruction is 
overdue.  A proverbial gap needs filling.  This Part begins to 
correct this omission by introducing GE to corporate govern-
ance for the first time,64 and by demonstrating its destabilizing 
implications for the majority’s presumption favoring market 
coordination.  Part III will then move to discuss GE’s positive 
implications for the legal corporate form and shareholder 
empowerment. 
Subpart II.A fills in the theoretical background.  It first 
goes back to the source of legal theory’s market coordination 
norm, describing the first and second theorems of welfare eco-
nomics.  Next, the discussion traverses the distinction between 
general and partial equilibrium modelling and shows how a 
legal theory that incorporates the market coordination norm by 
reference to partial equilibrium results—such as the J-M 
agency model—is intrinsically unsound. 
Subpart II.B turns to the fundamental Arrow-Debreu gen-
eral equilibrium model and its implicit promise that markets 
can be shown to be efficient coordinators of the economy.  We 
then show how GE models subsequent to Arrow-Debreu failed 
to make the promised showing.  GE was a great normative 
project motivated by the desire to validate market control, but 
it foundered on multiple, unstable equilibria and the unsolv-
able problem of market incompleteness. 
A. From Partial to General Equilibrium 
Legal theory’s norm favoring market coordination is extra-
polated from the first and second fundamental theorems of 
welfare economics.  The first fundamental theorem holds that 
when supply and demand for a product constitute a competi-
tive equilibrium, the allocation of the product among consum-
ers is Pareto optimal; that is, it is impossible to make one 
consumer better off without making another worse off.65  The 
theorem amounts to a formal statement of Adam Smith’s invisi-
64 The introduction has been made previously, as regards securities regula-
tion, see Yoon-Ho Alex Lee, The Efficiency Criterion for Securities Regulation: Inves-
tor Welfare or Total Surplus?, 57 ARIZ. L. REV. 85, 120 (2015); and financial 
contracting.  Peter H. Huang, A Normative Analysis of New Financially Engineered 
Derivatives, 73 S. CAL. L. REV. 471, 496–503 (2000). 
65 MAS-COLELL ET AL., supra note 10, at 326. 
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ble hand66—the powerful idea that self-motivated individuals, 
coordinated only by the price system, can act in mutual 
compatibility.67 
The second fundamental theorem of welfare economics 
holds that any allocation of goods that is Pareto optimal can be 
the outcome of a competitive equilibrium, after an appropriate 
lump-sum redistribution of initial endowments.  In English, if 
an efficient allocation of goods is desired, a benevolent state 
planner can redistribute wealth from consumer A to consumer 
B and then let the price system generate the efficient out-
come.68  This implies that problems of efficiency and distribu-
tion can be separated and makes a negative suggestion 
regarding state intervention in the economy.  Since the market 
can get the economy to the efficient production frontier, redis-
tribution of wealth is the only justification for governmental 
intervention. 
Thus stated, the first and second theorems do indeed sup-
port the law and economics norm favoring market coordina-
tion.  But, as we will see in subpart II.B, the support only 
follows under the strict conditions that delimit the formal mod-
els underpinning the theorems.  Corporate legal theory, how-
ever, ignores these conditions.  Instead, it relies on a 
particularization of the first fundamental theorem in the J-M 
agency model (combined with the efficient market hypothesis of 
financial economics).69  The model assumes that management 
moral hazard is the firm’s only unsolved problem—that is, but 
for management moral hazard, corporate production and in-
vestment would realize a Pareto optimal competitive equilib-
rium—and applies contractual and market controls to 
minimize agency costs. 
The narrow analysis of agency theory is typical of partial 
equilibrium models.  For a comparison, consider the partial 
66 1 ADAM SMITH, AN  INQUIRY INTO THE  NATURE AND CAUSES OF THE  WEALTH OF 
NATIONS  421 (Cannan ed., 1904), http://oll.libertyfund.org/titles/smith-an-in-
quiry-into-the-nature-and-causes-of-the-weatlh-of-nations-cannan-ed-vol-1 
[https://perma.cc/NT2Z-GQER]. 
67 John Geanakoplos, Arrow-Debreu Model of General Equilibrium, in 1 THE 
NEW PALGRAVE DICTIONARY OF ECONOMICS 119 (John Eatwell et al. eds., 1987).  The 
coordination that takes place through the price system is only implicit, as con-
sumers are price-takers even as their preferences determine the set of prices in 
the aggregate.  In the literature, to emphasize the coordination function of prices, 
prices are also termed as signals. 
68 See MAS-COLELL ET AL., supra note 10, at 326–27. 
69 See supra note 38. 
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equilibrium analysis of the pricing of goods,70 which is a main-
stay of antitrust analysis.  This exercise deals with the market 
for a single good and determines the market’s equilibrium out-
come in isolation from all other markets and prices, which are 
held to be fixed.  As in the J-M agency model, the exercise 
proceeds on the assumption that “all other things [are] 
equal.”71  The market under study does not interact with the 
rest of the economy and has no external effects.  Nor do 
changes in the prices of other markets affect consumer wealth 
and thereby influence the demand for the good in the market 
under study.72 
GE, in contrast, is a general equilibrium model.  The dis-
tinction, elided in law and economics, is fundamental in eco-
nomics itself.  Unlike partial equilibrium analyses, a general 
microeconomic theory is constructed from primitive concepts 
and minimal assumptions and tries to explain phenomena 
from a general perspective.  That is, in a general equilibrium 
framework, the equilibrium concept sweeps in all markets si-
multaneously and incorporates their interactions,73 looking at 
the economy as a closed and interrelated system in which we 
simultaneously determine the equilibrium values of all vari-
ables of interest. 
The narrow J-M construct grew as it came to be applied in 
less rigorous legal contexts, becoming more general and taking 
on a deep normative coloration.  E-F extended the palette of 
market controls to include, inter alia, shareholder intervention 
by hostile takeover.  The later post-takeover extension of E-F 
took an additional step, assuming unacceptably high residual 
70 Partial equilibrium analysis is also known as Marshallian partial equilib-
rium analysis. See generally ALFRED MARSHALL, PRINCIPLES OF ECONOMICS 269–75 
(8th ed., reprinted 2013) (pioneering the study of partial equilibrium). 
71 See STARR, supra, note 6, at 3. 
72 MARSHALL, supra note 70, at 343. 
73 Ross Starr clarifies the importance of cross reference with an illustration 
from the domestic automobile industry, which experienced a sudden downturn in 
2005 that continued through the financial crisis.  The shift in consumer demand 
had nothing to do with the car companies’ production methods or the quality of 
the product.  It had to do with the price of oil, which rose sharply and stayed high. 
High oil prices meant high gasoline prices, which caused consumers to shift to 
fuel efficient cars.  Unfortunately, the domestic manufacturers had been concen-
trating on highly profitable but gas-guzzling sport utility vehicles, and so took a 
beating when shifts in the natural resources market caused preferences to 
change.  Says Starr: “Because there are distinctive interactions across markets 
(e.g., among the price of oil, the price of gasoline, and the demand for SUVs) it is 
important that the equilibrium concept include interactive simultaneous determi-
nation of equilibrium prices across markets.  The concept can then represent a 
solution concept for the economy as a whole and not merely for a single market 
artificially isolated.” STARR, supra note 6, at 4–5. 
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agency costs and looking to regulation to jumpstart new mar-
ket controls.  But real generality has never been achieved.  The 
framework of reference always hews to J-M’s initial assumption 
that agency cost reduction—and hence greater shareholder in-
fluence—always enhances efficiency because all other things 
are equal and efficient. 
It bears noting that other partial equilibrium models 
problematize shareholder influence, suggesting that it might 
involve negative trade-offs.  These tradeoffs were first intro-
duced in the late 1980s when Jeremy Stein posited that myopic 
management responses to shareholder-driven stock market 
pressures could sacrifice value.74  Stein’s model shifts the lo-
cus of imperfection from management moral hazard to another 
set of asymmetric information—that shareholders know less 
than managers when it comes to corporate affairs—and then 
endogenizes management investment decisions in anticipation 
of future hostile shareholder action.  Inefficiencies result.75 
Both the analytical constructs in J-M and Stein are quite 
realistic even as they lead to opposing outcomes regarding 
shareholder power.  But how is one to choose which model is 
“right”? How can we normatively choose one model over the 
other?  We argue that we cannot.  Both models should be seen 
as useful examples.  They are potentially powerful as such, for 
examples can highlight logical shortcomings in normative ar-
guments.  But when a particular example is not robust to 
counterexample—as in the case of the J-M and Stein models— 
it cannot provide the basis for a normative theory.  Corporate 
legal theory, however, is oblivious to this result; instead, it 
takes J-M’s brilliant example and deploys it as a normative 
theory of corporate governance. 
The turn toward empirical testing in both financial eco-
nomics and academic corporate law bespeaks discomfort with 
the unsatisfactory state of the theory.  Unfortunately, it is un-
likely that the accumulating factual findings will cure the mar-
ket control paradigm’s theoretical infirmity by proving that 
shareholder empowerment always enhances welfare.  Corpo-
rate decision-making tends to be endogenous.  Empirical in-
quiry into its causes and effects accordingly presents 
identification problems that make it possible to mistake corre-
74 See Stein, Takeover Threats, supra note 7, at 61–62; Stein, Efficient Capital 
Markets, supra note 7, at 667. 
75 Stein, Takeover Threats, supra note 7, at 64–67. 
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lation for causation.76  We generally lack exogenous events that 
we can use to mitigate the problem.  Moreover, we lack a mea-
sure that can globally capture firm value rather than just 
shareholder value, which disables the use of empirical testing 
to support propositions about aggregate welfare.  Finally, even 
if we assume that the stock price provides a reliable proxy for 
firm value (in the sense of aggregate welfare), we could not be 
sure that short-term observations proxy for long-term value. 
Analysis of long time-series is difficult, for it only rarely hap-
pens that one has sufficient data and time variation to make 
the analysis credible.77 
None of this implies that partial equilibrium models are so 
constrained as to be useless nor that the empirical project is a 
failure.  It just means that one’s expectations should be lim-
ited—partial equilibrium models and empirical testing help us 
understand what happens at a local (as opposed to general) 
level when a few variables are changed.  Normative proposi-
tions, however, presuppose a rigorous general equilibrium 
analysis of the problem at hand.78  This means that only GE 
studies can aspire to normative implications.  We turn to those 
studies next. 
B. A Primer on General Equilibrium (GE) 
1. The Arrow-Debreu Model 
The Arrow-Debreu (A-D) model, derived in 1954,79 was the 
first rigorous (that is, formulated in a purely mathematical 
form) demonstration of the first and second fundamental theo-
rems in a general equilibrium setting.  It is thus the corner-
stone of GE theory and normative economics.80 
76 Compare K.J. Martijn Cremers, Lubomir P. Litov & Simone M. Sepe, Stag-
gered Boards and Long-Term Firm Value, Revisited, 126 J. FIN. ECON. 422, 423 
(2017), with Lucian A. Bebchuk & Alma Cohen, The Costs of Entrenched Boards, 
78 J. FIN. ECON. 409, 409–11 (2005) (presenting opposite results on staggered 
boards and firm value, addressing relevant identification issues differently, with 
the difference in treatment largely explaining the different results). 
77 See Cremers & Sepe, supra note 61, at 91. 
78 See MAS-COLELL ET AL., supra note 10, at 343. 
79 See Arrow & Debreu, supra note 11. 
80 GE (in general) is concerned with allocation of commodities across time 
and under uncertainty, while the A-D model studies the allocations that can be 
achieved through the exchange of commodities at one moment in time.  Accord-
ingly, proving the results in the A-D model is a necessary condition for any further 
development in GE.  In other words, if the model does not work in the A-D descrip-
tion, a fortiori the model does not work with uncertainty and over time. See 
Geanakoplos, supra note 67, at 116.  For an historical account of general equilib-
rium theory, see BRUNA  INGRAO & GIORGIO  ISRAEL, THE  INVISIBLE  HAND: ECONOMIC 
EQUILIBRIUM IN THE HISTORY OF SCIENCE 295–98 (1990). 
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Specifically, the A-D model derives a competitive equilib-
rium that connects (1) the pricing of multiple (but finite) num-
bers of commodities (each of which has a quantifiable and 
directly measurable price), with (2) the production of the com-
modities by firms possessing technologies, and (3) the con-
sumption of commodities by consumers possessing 
endowments of tradable equity securities in all firms in the 
economy.  Restated, the model shows that in a competitive 
equilibrium, demand and supply simultaneously determine 
prices, so that the marginal rate of substitution for consumers 
(i.e., the amount of a good that the consumer is willing to give 
up for another good) and the marginal rate of transformation 
for firms (the amount of a good that must be sacrificed in order 
to produce an additional unit of another good) are equal to 
relative prices.81  General competitive equilibrium thus allows 
for the greatest diversity in goals and resources.82  Under it, 
“[e]very desire of each consumer, no matter how whimsical, is 
met by the voluntary supply of some producer.  And this is true 
for all markets and consumers simultaneously.”83 
This result, however, relies on Herculean assumptions.  To 
begin with, an equilibrium can only be “competitive” when all 
firms are profit maximizing, all consumers are utility maximiz-
ers, and there is neither excess demand nor excess supply for 
each good.84  In addition, markets are assumed to be “com-
plete,” meaning that there is a market for each good in the 
economy,85 information is symmetric (no one knows more than 
81 What matters in the model are the relative prices, as the price level is 
irrelevant.  That is, for the GE analysis of two goods, whether the goods’ prices 
respectively are 5 and 10 or 10 and 20 is irrelevant as the relative prices are the 
same. LENGWILER, supra note 12, at 20. 
82 See Geanakopolus, supra note 67, at 119. 
83 Id. 
84 MAS-COLELL ET AL., supra note 10, at 314–15. 
85 Id. at 314–15, 704.  More particularly, the A-D model poses that technolo-
gies, endowments, and preferences depend on the state of the world, which pro-
vides a complete description of possible uncertain outcomes.  To capture this 
relationship, the model introduces state-contingent commodities—rights to re-
ceive a unit of a physical good if and only if a particular state of the world occurs. 
In the model, titles to these state contingent commodities are transferred via 
assets or securities.  An asset is a right to receive physical goods at a future date 
in an amount that varies depending on which contingent state occurs.  A security 
is a similar right paying cash instead of physical goods; an “Arrow security” pays 1 
if a certain state occurs and 0 in all other states.  The market completeness 
requirement carries over to the Arrow securities—the model assumes that there 
exists a market for every state-dependent contingency and that these markets 
open before uncertainty is resolved. (This means that what is being purchased or 
sold in the market for each contingent commodity is the commitment to receive or 
deliver amounts of the commodity at hand.) Thus equipped, agents are un-
restricted in their wealth transfers across states and their asset portfolio choices 
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does anybody else),86 and all externalities are taken into ac-
count and priced (which, as a practical matter, means exclud-
ing externalities).  All producers and consumers must also be 
price takers; that is, they must be so small in relation to the 
market that their actions do not affect it, denuding all actors of 
market power.87  Further, consumer preferences, among other 
things,88 must be “convex.” This means consumers have di-
minishing marginal rates of substitution and always prefer 
mixtures of goods to extreme bundles (baskets including two 
bundles of commodities are always at least as good as baskets 
only including one of the two bundles).89  Last, producing firms 
must have a diminishing marginal rate of transformation and 
nonincreasing returns to scale. 
2. GE’s Evolution 
Subsequent GE models attempted to relax the A-D model’s 
strict assumptions.  In doing so, however, they ran into serious 
problems concerning the competitive equilibrium’s uniqueness, 
its stability and, most importantly, the completeness of 
markets.90 
First, a robust general equilibrium must be unique, for ab-
sent this quality, the theory lacks predictive power.  To see 
why, assume that, pursuant to the second fundamental theo-
rem, a benevolent planner redistributes endowments in an A-D 
economy and then sits back and lets the market reach a new 
induce the same after-initial period consumption as in a world where uncertainty 
is excluded.  That is, complete insurance against uncertain and negative future 
outcomes is achieved, allowing Pareto optimality to be reached. Id. at 704. 
86 Id. at 550. 
87 Id. at 314–15, 327. 
88 Consumers are also able to ordinate their preferences without violating 
transitivity (if I prefer x to y and I prefer y to z, I cannot prefer z to x) and 
preferences are local nonsatiated, meaning that consumers prefer more than less 
of a commodity. See id. at 42. 
89 See Geanakopolus, supra note 67, at 117–18. 
90 Conversely, GE models have successfully solved problems concerning the 
existence of the competitive equilibrium.  These problems arise due to excess 
demand (the difference between demand and supply) and the aggregation of heter-
ogeneous consumer preferences. See MAS-COLELL ET AL., supra note 10, at 
580–81.  Inquiries into the existence of an equilibrium given excess demand reach 
highly positive results. See Gérard Debreu, New Concepts and Techniques for 
Equilibrium Analysis, 3 INT’L ECON. REV. 257, 257–58 (1962) (proving the existence 
of competitive equilibrium under very general hypotheses without serious restric-
tions on the kind of the economy under description). 
There is even an equilibrium when consumers fail to satisfy some of the basic 
A-D assumptions on preferences.  Andreu Mas-Colell, An Equilibrium Existence 
Theorem Without Complete or Transitive Preferences, 1 J. MATHEMATICAL ECON. 237, 
238–39 (1974) (showing an equilibrium given noncomplete and nontransitive con-
sumer preferences). 
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equilibrium.  If there are two possible equilibrium outcomes 
(that is, the equilibrium is not unique) and one is more desira-
ble than the other, the market might converge toward the 
wrong one.91  Unfortunately, GE’s results on uniqueness have 
been disastrous.  Under the Sonnenshein92-Mantel93-Debreu94 
theorem (also known as the “Anything Goes” theorem95), the 
theory cannot get a grip on a characterization of aggregate 
consumer demand, with the result that almost any continuous 
pattern of price movements can occur.  This has numerous 
negative implications, including that the price system may fail 
to provide a valid system of signals.96 
Second, a robust general equilibrium needs to be stable. 
To see why, assume that the market converges on a unique and 
desirable equilibrium but that any minor random event can 
dislodge the economy from this outcome.97  Instability thus 
implies suboptimality.  To predict a stable equilibrium, the the-
ory has to show the process by which the equilibrium is 
reached—the price adjustment mechanism.  References to “the 
magic of the marketplace” will not suffice.  Stability, however, 
has been established only under highly restrictive assump-
91 Frank Ackerman, Still Dead After All These Years: Interpreting the Failure of 
General Equilibrium Theory, in THE FLAWED FOUNDATIONS OF GENERAL EQUILIBRIUM: 
CRITICAL ESSAYS ON ECONOMIC THEORY 16 (Frank Ackerman et al. eds., 2004). 
92 Hugo Sonnenschein, Market Excess Demand Functions, 40 ECONOMETRICA 
549, 560–61 (1972). 
93 Rolf R. Mantel, On the Characterization of Aggregate Excess Demand, 7 J. 
ECON. THEORY 348, 348 (1974). 
94 Gérard Debreu, Excess Demand Functions, 1 J. MATHEMATICAL ECON. 15, 15 
(1974). 
95 MAS-COLELL ET AL., supra note 10, at 598. 
96 See Alan Kirman, The Intrinsic Limits of Modern Economic Theory: The 
Emperor Has No Clothes, 99 ECON. J. 126, 27–32 (1989).  Additional negative 
implications include that: (1) as we do not know the excess aggregate function, we 
could have multiplicity of equilibria; and (2) as we do not know the shape of the 
aggregate function, we cannot do comparative statics and empirical work is sub-
ject to reverse causality problems. Id. 
97 Id. 
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tions.98  This has, again, important consequences,99 including 
the inability of assuming that quick movement of prices implies 
an equally quick attainment of equilibrium100 and the possibil-
ity of trading outside of the equilibrium, which in turn means 
that the equilibrium eventually reached will be path-
dependent.101 
The third, fundamental, problem with A-D is that, even 
given unique and stable equilibria, competitive equilibrium re-
quires a complete set of markets.  In complete markets, there 
exists a complete set of state-contingent securities that allows 
the buying and selling of claims on any good at every future 
point of time and in all possible economic circumstances.102 
Given this, agents can deal with uncertainty by insuring each 
state separately, trading securities in such a way as to affect 
the payoff in one specific state without affecting the payoffs in 
other states, almost as if uncertainty did not exist. 
A reasonable observer of the world quickly will conclude 
that markets are not, in fact, complete.  GE theorists explain 
this by pointing to a familiar list of real-world imperfections. 
First, there may be asymmetric information: one party may 
have “hidden knowledge” of her skills or the quality of the ser-
vices she performs, which leads to adverse selection, or she 
may take “hidden actions” that are not observable to others, 
98 See THORSTEN HENS & BEATE PILGRIM, GENERAL  EQUILIBRIUM FOUNDATION OF 
FINANCE 83–84 (2002) (discussing other cases where it is possible to establish 
uniqueness, such as an economy with only one representative consumer or in 
which the distribution of endowments is already Pareto efficient); Kenneth J. 
Arrow, H.D. Block & Leonid Hurwitz, On the Stability of the Competitive Equilib-
rium II, 27 ECONOMETRICA 82, 86–93 (1959) (proving the stability of the equilibrium 
only by imposing the restrictive assumption of gross substitutability for commodi-
ties).  Arrow and Hahn attempted to formalize the price setting process only to 
conclude that “it would be quite wrong to conclude that the price mechanism 
works from a demonstration of stability.” KENNETH J. ARROW & F.H. HAHN, GENERAL 
COMPETITIVE ANALYSIS 282 (1971) 
99 Frank Hahn summarized the results of the inquiry on stability as follows: 
“There is at present no satisfactory axiomatic foundation on which to build a 
theory of learning, of adjusting to errors and of delay times in each of these.  It 
may be that in some intrinsic sense such a theory [of stability] is impossible.  But 
without it this branch of the subject can aspire to no more than the study of a 
series of suggestive examples.”  Frank Hahn, Stability, in 2 HANDBOOK OF MATHE-
MATICAL  ECONOMICS 745, 747 (Kenneth J. Arrow & Michael D. Intriligator eds., 
1982). 
100 Franklin M. Fisher, The Stability of General Equilibrium—What Do We 
Know and Why is it Important?, in GENERAL EQUILIBRIUM ANALYSIS: A CENTURY AFTER 
WALRAS 35, 37 (Pascal Bridel ed., 2011). 
101 Id.  This further implies that it is very risky to plan a particular economy 
and then decentralize it using markets. Id. 
102 See supra note 85. 
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which leads to moral hazard.103  Moral hazard, in turn, may 
limit the availability of credit, which chills the creation of asset 
markets.104  Second, there are limits on actors’ abilities to pro-
ject the future.  Some events are inconceivable;105 projections 
of predictable events are impaired by “bounded rationality,” 
which are limits on ability to calculate optimal strategies.106 
Third, the cost of establishing and specifying a particular asset 
market might not be covered by the profit earned by the entre-
preneur who opens the market.107  Transaction costs or other 
frictions may also inhibit the access to the market by the popu-
lation of traders who otherwise would make use of it. 
The results of studies of the impact of market incomplete-
ness are not encouraging.108  The studies show that with in-
complete markets, there is a commitment problem that may 
lead to a coordination failure: when a market is missing, con-
sumers are disabled from making forward commitments.  The 
lack of commitment in turn negatively impacts the producers, 
leading to suboptimal outcomes.109  Other studies fail to yield 
equilibria at all110 and still others show that the opening of a 
new market, which reduces the quantum of incompleteness, 
can in fact make everybody worse off.111 
103 See Jean-Jacques Laffont, A Brief Overview of the Economics of Incomplete 
Markets, 65 ECON. REC. 54, 55–56 (1989).  In addition, symmetrically available 
information may be nonverifiable. See id. 
104 See John Geanakoplos, An Introduction to General Equilibrium with Incom-
plete Asset Markets, 19 J. MATHEMATICAL ECON. 1, 2 (1990). 
105 Laffont, supra note 103, at 55. 
106 Geanakoplos, supra note 104, at 2 n.1; MAGILL & QUINZII, supra note 20, at 
13. 
107 Geanakoplos, supra note 104, at 2. 
108 Much of GE assumes market incompleteness and consequently gives up on 
the achievement of Pareto optimality.  A less demanding criterion, constrained 
Pareto efficiency, is substituted.  This defines the optimality of markets relative to 
the limited ability of agents to redistribute income across future contingencies. 
See Geanakoplos, supra note 104, at 7; MAS-COLELL ET AL., supra note 10, at 710. 
That is, the result is optimal relative to the set of allocations that can be achieved 
through the existing (incomplete) market structure. See Oliver D. Hart, On the 
Optimality of Equilibrium When the Market Structure is Incomplete, 11 J. ECON. 
THEORY 418, 419 (1975). 
109 See Geanakoplos, supra note 104, at 4. 
110 See John Geanakoplos & Herakles Polemarchakis, Existence, Regularity, 
and Constrained Suboptimality of Competitive Allocations When Markets are In-
complete, in 3 ESSAYS IN HONOR OF KENNETH ARROW 77 (Walter P. Heller, Ross M. 
Starr & David A. Starrett eds., 1986).  The authors consider an incomplete market 
setting with real assets—markets are incomplete because the number of assets is 
lower than the possible future states of the world. Id. at 70.  However, one of the 
assumptions needed in the model to obtain the equilibrium, which presupposes 
the absence of arbitrage, is the very possibility of arbitrage. Id. 
111 See Hart, supra note 108, at 439. 
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Uniqueness and stability problems, combined with incom-
plete markets, denude the welfare theorems of much of their 
predictive power.  In the end, microeconomic theory does not 
predict that competitive markets reliably coordinate the econ-
omy.  This is the lesson of GE, a lesson that, as we explain next, 
corporate legal theory can no longer ignore in the wake of the 
rise of empowered shareholders. 
III 
CORPORATE GOVERNANCE AND INCOMPLETE MARKETS 
The public corporation, once described as a hierarchical 
model of organization, has been reshaped into a more market-
run entity.  To evaluate this shift of production decisions to 
markets, we need to bring GE with incomplete markets to the 
forefront of corporate legal theory. 
We do so in four steps.  In subpart III.A, we first show how 
GE does positive work when applied to corporate governance, 
helping to explain particulars of the legal corporate form and 
expanding on Coase’s description of corporate production. 
Subpart III.B then moves to GE’s implications for shareholder 
empowerment, discussing its prediction that shareholder par-
ticipation in business planning will be ridden with incentive 
problems and lead to suboptimal results.  Subpart III.C turns 
to recent asset pricing theory and describes the theory’s lesson 
that pricing based on objective valuation coexists in an incom-
plete market with pricing based on supply and demand, which 
confirms the caution raised in GE about market-driven corpo-
rate production.  Subpart III.D questions a contrasting picture 
of efficient market completeness advanced by Ron Gilson and 
Jeffrey Gordon. 
A. GE and the Theory of the Firm 
GE aspires to model an economy in which markets work so 
well as to obviate the need for hierarchical organization.  It is in 
this sense a polar opposite to Ronald Coase’s transaction cost-
based explanation of hierarchical production.112  But, as we 
have seen, the GE project stalled because the models showed 
that markets, due to incompleteness and other problems, can-
not accomplish complex production.  It follows that once we 
take incompleteness into account, GE becomes surprisingly 
compatible with the Coasean perspective and even can be 
112 See supra text accompanying notes 22–24. 
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drawn on to explain the basic elements of the legal model of the 
firm. 
Where Coase pointed to transaction costs in explaining 
hierarchical coordination, GE, which posits that hierarchical 
coordination would be unnecessary in complete markets, 
would point to the factors that cause market incompleteness. 
It thereby would repeat Coase’s transaction cost explanation 
and go on to flesh it out, adding imperfect information and 
limitations on ability to project. 
In this reverse GE model,113 we can go on to explain the 
notable features of the legal form of the corporation: locked-in 
capital, transferable shares, limited liability, centralized man-
agement through a board of directors, and perpetual existence. 
The law provides for these features to address problems that 
arise out of market incompleteness.  Conversely, in complete 
markets, these features would be redundant; for given com-
plete markets, prices would guide production decisions and the 
system would have no need for centralized, hierarchical 
planning. 
Consider first capital lock-in, imposed by the legal form to 
import stability by preventing individual shareholders (and 
their creditors) from withdrawing capital contributions to meet 
liquidity needs.  In complete markets, there would be no stabil-
ity problems, for individual liquidity needs would never impact 
production planning because investors could buy a state-con-
tingent set of securities providing full insurance against future 
consumption shocks.114  Locked-in capital would be redun-
dant.  The same would go for transferable shares, which are 
only necessary because capital is locked-in, providing a safety 
valve for investors who need to monetize their investments to 
meet consumption shocks. Limited liability would also not be 
an equilibrium result under complete markets, as investors 
could write a set of complete contracts specifying the level of 
individual liability based on their risk preferences. Centralized 
decision-making would be unnecessary because, as we will ex-
plain in subpart III.B, investors could directly run the firm and 
always reach optimal unanimous decisions; for in complete 
markets investors have the same information, perfect hedging 
against future consumption shocks, and no collective action 
113 We follow Peter H. Huang & Michael S. Knoll, Corporate Finance, Corporate 
Law and Finance Theory, 74 S. CAL. L. REV. 175, 179 (2000), which shows the 
explanatory power of the Modigliani-Miller hypothesis lies in illustrating why 
capital structure irrelevance does not obtain in the real world. 
114 See supra note 85. 
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problems.  Finally, given investor unanimity in complete mar-
kets, the requirement of perpetual existence would not matter, 
for investors would make correct, unanimous decisions about 
future commitments on a going-concern basis. 
B. GE Models of Shareholder Decision-Making 
Recall that the market control paradigm asserts that 
shareholder governance makes sense because shareholders 
have correctly aligned incentives and stock market pricing 
holds out a robust informational focal point.  GE analysis 
counters both assertions, predicting precisely the opposite. 
1. Shareholder Incentives 
Critically, in GE management hierarchies are assumed 
away115 and the shareholders directly make the firm’s produc-
tion decisions, with the shareholder population simultaneously 
making up the economy’s population of individual consumers. 
Within this analytical framework, the outcomes (efficient or 
inefficient) of shareholder decision-making regarding produc-
tion turn on the distinction between complete and incomplete 
markets. 
Given complete markets, all shareholders place the same 
value on the firm’s future returns.  This is because they can 
deal with uncertainty by insuring their consumption prefer-
ences through a set of state-contingent securities that is equal 
to the number of all possible future states of the world.  In such 
an environment, all shareholders will agree on a single plan of 
production and investment that pursues the objective of maxi-
mizing the present value of the firm’s returns—a value that will 
equal fundamental value and be manifested in the market price 
of the firm’s securities.116  Market completeness thus fulfils a 
necessary condition for the operation of the Fisher separation 
theorem, under which a firm should increase its value to the 
fullest extent regardless of the preferences of its owners.117 
115 Management moral hazard accordingly does not figure into the risks 
against which the market provide insurance, although it still figures in GE as a 
source of market incompleteness.  For an extension of general equilibrium analy-
sis into environments with moral hazard and adverse selection problems, see 
Edward C. Prescott & Robert M. Townsend, Pareto Optima and Competitive Equi-
libria with Adverse Selection and Moral Hazard, 52 ECONOMETRICA  21 (1984). 
116 John Geanakoplos, Michael Magill, Martine Quinzii & Jean Drèze, Generic 
Inefficiency of Stock Market Equilibrium When Markets are Incomplete, 19 J. MATH-
EMATICAL ECON. 113, 121 (1990). 
117 IRVING FISHER, THE THEORY OF INTEREST 141 (1930). 
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With market incompleteness, however, the number of fi-
nancial assets available to the actors to insure against uncer-
tain future states of the world is less than the number of future 
states.  This means that the actors in the economy can only 
insure their position by using currently available assets.  GE 
shows mathematically that under this condition market coordi-
nation cannot yield an optimal allocation of resources.118 
The basic insight can be variously described.  One ap-
proach focuses on limitations on the actors’ available informa-
tion and ability to project.  To see this, imagine that an 
omniscient planner redistributes the economy’s resources at 
an initial date.119  This change will directly affect the actors’ 
wealth in all possible future states.  The change will also indi-
rectly affect equilibrium prices at the future dates.  The planner 
can take into account the two effects simultaneously.  Private 
actors, in contrast, can consider only the direct effect on their 
own wealth because, under the atomistic assumption, they do 
not consider the general equilibrium effect on prices produced 
by their actions, behaving as if the value of their assets would 
not change.120  Inefficient allocations of resources result and 
the actors end up being underinsured (or overinsured) against 
future states of the world.121 
Alternatively, one can focus on the actors’ limited ability to 
transfer wealth across states (that is, for future consumption) 
when markets are incomplete.  For example, assume that there 
are two actors who need to buy financial assets X and Y in 
order to transfer wealth in states A and B (for insurance pur-
poses), respectively.  However, assume that there is no market 
118 See Geanakoplos, supra note 104, at 26. 
119 The standard approach of GE is to define an optimum on the assumption 
that a planner—hypothetical omniscient, benevolent sovereign—can achieve that 
result and then to verify that the optimum can be decentralized as a market 
equilibrium.  If the markets do not yield the optimal equilibrium allocation (or, 
under incomplete markets, an equilibrium at all), the theory remits us back to the 
planner. 
120 ´BERNARD SALANIE, THE MICROECONOMICS OF MARKET FAILURES 212–13 (2000). 
121 See Joseph E. Stiglitz, The Inefficiency of the Stock Market Equilibrium, 49 
REV. ECON. STUD. 241, 242 (1982). 
With a complete set of risks markets, we know we wish to equalize 
the marginal rates of substitution between any two states for all 
individuals.  With an incomplete set of markets, we cannot do this, 
but we may be able to have a more “efficient” distribution of risks 
(come closer to equalizing, on average, the marginal rates of substi-
tution) if we can change the price distribution (and thus the “profit 
distribution”) associated with the risky asset.  The government rec-
ognizes that it can change this price distribution by altering the 
allocation of investment and the ownership shares in the different 
assets.  The market ignores this effect. 
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for X and Y, because markets are incomplete.  In response, the 
actors will buy the available asset Z to the same purpose.  As a 
result, the price of Z will rise too high and the actors will be 
unable to transfer wealth across states efficiently.  In other 
words, in incomplete markets individuals are not optimally co-
ordinated by the price system and may direct excessive re-
sources toward their state of relative deprivation, without 
considering the effect (that is, the pecuniary externality122) 
they impose on others when they trade (such as a higher secur-
ity price). 
The combination of insufficient insurance against uncer-
tain future states of the world and the shareholders’ different 
marginal propensities to consume (some want more in the near 
future while others are more patient) creates a problem when 
shareholders govern directly.  The question is whether, given 
heterogeneous consumption preferences, the shareholders will 
choose the most valuable investment project. 
In some situations, GE answers yes.  If investors can ascer-
tain the project’s value by reference to currently traded securi-
ties, which are assumed to reflect the value of the projects of 
other firms in the economy,123 and the project is very small as 
regards the economy as a whole, the project, in the parlance of 
GE, is “spannable,”124 and the shareholders can be expected to 
make an undistorted choice.  Notwithstanding heterogeneous 
consumption preferences and the lack of full insurance, Fisher 
separation will still occur—the shareholders will unanimously 
approve the value maximizing result and each traded security 
will accordingly have a unique equilibrium price.125 
GE, however, counsels this will not be the usual result. 
Most projects do not satisfy the spanning condition, because 
one cannot extrapolate a certain projection from existing as-
122 As an application consider the case of fire sales.  If the agents acted cooper-
atively (a condition which contradicts competitive markets), they could reduce the 
negative effect of fire sales.  From a GE perspective, fire sales create a pecuniary 
externality that is not internalized by the price system, because what each agent 
expects to lose upon the occurrence of a “bad” state is less than what the economy 
as whole expects to lose. See generally Guido Lorenzoni, Inefficient Credit Booms, 
75 REV. ECON. STUD. 809 (2008) (showing how the conjunction of the combination 
of limited commitment in financial contracts and the fact that asset prices are 
determined in a spot market generates a pecuniary externality that is not inter-
nalized in private contracts). 
123 See Oliver D. Hart, Take-Over Bids and Stock Market Equilibrium, 16 J. 
ECON. THEORY 53, 54 n.3 (1977) (“[E]very feasible production plan of every firm can 
be expressed as a linear combination of the existing production plans of firms in 
the economy.”). 
124 Or, in the alternative, it satisfies the “spanning condition.” 
125 MAS-COLELL ET AL., supra note 10, at 714–15. 
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sets.  Indeed, when a firm’s investment project is different from 
those currently offered in the economy—for example, because 
it involves a new technology or the production of new goods or 
services—currently traded assets can no longer be relied upon 
to ascertain the value of the new project.  Problems ensue. 
First, the only way for a shareholder to value the project is to 
apply her own understanding of the working of the economy. 
As different shareholders naturally see things differently, 
“quoting” problems may follow.  Second, when shareholders 
lack full insurance and the spanning condition is not satisfied, 
their heterogeneous consumption preferences do affect a pro-
ject’s evaluation.  The shareholders anticipate that once the 
security reflecting the unspannable project starts trading, it 
can be used to effect wealth transfers across actors in future 
states (for insurance purposes).  The wealth transfers in turn 
affect supply and demand across the economy for all commodi-
ties, leading to a change in relative prices.  The price change 
leads to yet another redistribution of wealth.  This in turn loops 
back to the shareholders’ project selection: rational sharehold-
ers will look to the wealth allocation effect and the commodity 
pricing effect in addition to the project’s fundamental value.126 
Under these conditions, shareholder disagreement results 
regarding project selection.  Fisher separation is lost because 
the goal of profit maximization becomes a matter of subjective 
decision-making varying with the shareholders’ own visions of 
the economy and idiosyncratic preferences regarding future 
consumption.  An individual shareholder’s insurance concerns 
are not necessarily collinear with the goal of maximizing the 
firm’s present value.  The outcome will not be efficient127 and 
security equilibrium prices might well be multiple rather than 
unique. 
Strategies for ameliorating the shareholder selection prob-
lem have been suggested in the literature.  Drèze shows that it 
is possible to replicate full insurance artificially through a bar-
gaining mechanism.128  The logic is similar to that of Coasean 
bargaining: shareholders can negotiate among themselves and 
buy from each other a sort of insurance by receiving transfers 
from the others (if you want me to vote for plan x, you have to 
126 Geanakoplos et al., supra note 116, at 121. 
127 Id. at 134–35. 
128 Jacques H. Drèze, Investment Under Private Ownership: Optimality, Equilib-
rium and Stability, in ALLOCATION UNDER UNCERTAINTY: EQUILIBRIUM AND OPTIMALITY 
129–30 (Jacques H. Drèze ed., 1974). 
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pay me transfer t).129  DeMarzo turns to blockholders to solve 
the disagreement problem, showing that a dominant 
blockholder with a financial incentive to move the firm to a 
production plan that maximizes value can build a majority coa-
lition.130  The outcome, however, presupposes face-to-face bar-
gaining in a highly stylized boardroom.131 
Both strategies improve the shareholders’ lot by bringing in 
a holder owning a sufficient number of shares to align its inter-
ests with the optimal outcome and thereby avoid the incentive 
misalignment of shareholders with small stakes.  Both also in-
terpolate a venue for face-to-face contracting among the share-
holders, a requirement that severely limits their potential as 
regards real world public companies.  Ultimately, then, both 
cast doubt on real world applications of shareholder power in 
which the catalysts are shareholders holding relatively small 
blocks of stock, such as hedge funds and other newly empow-
ered shareholders. 
2. Implications for Shareholder Governance 
GE with incomplete markets sends warning signals regard-
ing the recent power shift in the public corporation.  It suggests 
that there is no reason to presume that shareholder-directed 
business planning is superior to board-directed business plan-
ning and any number of reasons to presume that a fiduciary 
board, despite the moral hazard problem, will be better 
incentivized. 
A potential objection to this reference to GE models needs 
to be addressed.  Actors in GE models are risk averse.  Corpo-
rate legal theory, in contrast, aspires to a risk neutrality model, 
making reference to portfolio theory.  If shareholders are risk 
neutral, then they have no need for the risk insurance held out 
129 Id.  A platform for face-to-face trade is required.  There is also a timing 
problem.  The production plan is chosen by new shareholders after shares have 
been traded in the stock market.  This condition, however, is difficult to meet in 
the real world.  For example, Sanford J. Grossman & Oliver D. Hart, A Theory of 
Competitive Equilibrium in Stock Market Economies, 47 ECONOMETRICA 293, 293 
(1979), observe that this condition prevents the analysis from being extended to a 
multiperiod model. 
130 Peter M. DeMarzo, Majority Voting and Corporate Control: The Rule of the 
Dominant Shareholder, 60 REV. ECON. STUD. 713, 719 (1993). 
131 The board must have agenda control.  Its members must either be share-
holders themselves or act on behalf of certain shareholders.  It must deliberate 
with unanimity.  Every member must have veto power.  Finally, the members of 
the board may bargain with each other over various proposals and negotiate 
transfers between themselves to win acceptance of a proposal. Id. at 728. 
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by complete markets132 and the distortions highlighted in GE 
should not be expected to follow from real world shareholder 
decision-making.  The suggestion of risk neutrality arguably 
strengthens with reference to current shareholding patterns. 
Less than one-third of publicly traded shares are held by retail 
investors—the investors who most closely resemble the con-
suming citizens modelled in GE.  The institutions that hold 
most of the stock readily come forth as candidates for charac-
terization as risk neutral. 
The risk neutrality picture dissipates on closer inspection, 
however.  Portfolio theory does not posit that economic actors 
are risk neutral, quite the contrary.  It asserts that investor risk 
aversion should be addressed in portfolio selection by includ-
ing a greater proportion of risk-free treasury securities rather 
than by including less risky stocks.  There follows a theorem of 
separation between subjective risk preferences and investment 
decisions,133 a theorem that carries over to management in-
vestment decision-making on the assumption that diversified 
shareholders are risk neutral as regards holdings in particular 
companies.  Retrograde governance implications follow.  Full 
diversification implies rational apathy as regards governance 
issues at particular companies and so leads to another kind of 
separation—the separation of ownership and control. 
Shareholder empowerment follows from a very different in-
centive template—that of a modern hedge fund manager rather 
than that of a passive portfolio investor.  The fund manager’s 
incentives, both as regards equity purchases and sales and 
governance inputs at particular companies, will be shaped by 
multiple influences, including, inter alia, the fund’s compensa-
tion structure and the fund’s relational posture with its own 
investors.  Investor relations in turn imply pressure to yield 
immediate and verifiable market-beating returns, particularly 
to the extent the fund’s capital is not locked in.  Given short 
term lock down periods, the manager’s marginal rate of substi-
tution between present and future will be very high.  There 
results a structural prediction that hedge funds will tend to be 
more impatient than investors whose capital is locked in or 
132 Similarly, in an exchange economy populated by infinitely-lived agents, it 
has been shown that self-insurance effected through investment in risk-free se-
curities can makes market incompleteness irrelevant, given also transitory 
shocks, common utility functions, and limited trading in assets. See David K. 
Levine & William R. Zame, Does Market Incompleteness Matter?, 70 ECONOMETRICA 
1805, 1805–06 (2002). 
133 See WILLIAM W. BRATTON, CORPORATE FINANCE: CASES AND MATERIALS 78–85 
(8th ed. 2016) 
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whose business model stresses diversification.  Once the hedge 
fund ascends to governance power, such selective incentives 
will prevent Fisher separation at portfolio companies and can 
lead to suboptimal investment decision-making.134 
In sum, hedge fund activists can be susceptible to subjec-
tive influences.  Their consumption preferences will be influ-
enced, on the low side, by the need to cater to investor 
preferences at the office and make tuition and mortgage pay-
ments at home, and, on the high side, by prospects for magni-
fying office influence and realizing aspirations for multiple 
dwellings, trophies of art and sport, and philanthropical recog-
nition.  While a special breed of people, they are people all the 
same and should be modelled as risk-averse rational actors. 
Now recall Part I’s suggestion that contemporary share-
holder intervention by hedge fund activists holds out a more 
salient challenge to the hierarchical model of the corporation 
than did the business planning disruptions of the takeover 
wave of the 1980s.  We here extend this analysis in light of GE’s 
analysis of shareholder incentive misalignment, comparing a 
contemporary hedge fund to a takeover era control purchaser. 
Activist interventions are thought to be smaller in size and less 
threatening than were hostile tender offers, for the activist 
works with the present team rather than throwing it out.  But 
this has a flip side.  The activist playbook implies a smaller 
investment in the target than that undertaken by a successful 
tender offeror.  The activist accordingly presents a much more 
severe problem of incentive misalignment.  Relatively speaking, 
a successful control purchaser is locked in because it can only 
exit by a negotiated sale or a public offering—it is the func-
tional equivalent of DeMarzo’s incentive compatible 
blockholder.  An activist, in contrast, makes sure to limit its 
stockholding to a percentage amount low enough to leave open 
an exit door to the existing trading market.135  The activist 
buying 5 to 10 percent of the target’s stock thus has more 
134 See, e.g., John C. Coffee, Jr. & Darius Palia, The Wolf at the Door: The 
Impact of Hedge Fund Activism on Corporate Governance, 41 J. CORP. L. 545, 593 
(2016) (opining that “wolf pack” teaming by activists results in excess 
empowerment). 
135 See, e.g., Nicole M. Boyson & Robert M. Mooradian, Experienced Hedge 
Fund Activists (Apr. 3, 2012) (unpublished manuscript) (American Finance Asso-
ciation 2012 Chicago Meetings Paper), http://ssrn.com/abstract=1787649 
[https://perma.cc/2YVE-YDKV] (finding a mean activist block holding of 8.8 per-
cent upon initial 13d-1 filing and a maximum accumulation mean holding of 12.4 
percent). 
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“optionality” than the control purchaser who invests in be-
tween 51 and 100 percent of the target. 
There is also an externality problem.  If the activist influ-
ences a firm’s investment policy and things turn out badly, the 
activist can still exit readily.  Control bidders of the takeover 
era, in contrast, had to internalize the long-term consequences 
of their production decisions.  The reservation of easily accessi-
ble exit seconds the suggestion that activist-driven production 
decisions will tend to be biased toward the short term, repli-
cating the incentive problem modelled in GE.  With activism, 
“pure” investment incentives described in the market control 
paradigm are nowhere to be seen. 
C. Asset Pricing in Incomplete Markets 
We have seen that, in incomplete markets, shareholders 
make production decisions that accommodate their own con-
sumption preferences and that this theoretical result resonates 
strongly with real world hedge funds.  A bias to production 
decisions that boost short-term outcomes may indeed follow.  A 
question arises at this point about the role of the stock price. 
Shareholder advocates rely on the EMH’s136 assurance of stock 
price accuracy and posit that asset prices provide a robust 
informational focal point, helping to address the asymmetry of 
information between firm insiders and stock market outsiders. 
Given semi-strong efficient pricing, shouldn’t we have a strong 
circumstantial guarantee against such a skew in a governance 
system that is stock market driven?  The answer is no.  Real 
world stock prices routinely depart from fundamental value 
and are open to influence from market-based events.  This 
analysis reverses the shareholder paradigm’s presumption of 
pure financial incentives at a fundamental theoretical level. 
Shareholder proponents refer to simple models of valuation 
which teach that long-term value is impounded in the present 
market price.137  But when these simple models confront in-
complete markets and unspannable assets, the EMH result 
disappears.  In this environment, the firm’s profit maximization 
is no longer objectively defined, shareholder disagreement may 
occur in equilibrium, and security prices may fail to reflect 
136 Hansmann & Kraakman, supra note 48, at 440–41 (the market price pro-
vides the “principal measure” of the shareholder interest). 
137 Bernard Black & Reinier Kraakman, Delaware’s Takeover Law: The Uncer-
tain Search for Hidden Value, 96 NW. U. L. REV. 521, 522 (2002). 
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optimal production decisions.  As a result, mispricing becomes 
a concrete possibility.138 
We will unpack the problems arising under the realistic 
assumption of incomplete markets and unspannable assets in 
three stages: first, we compare EMH to heterogeneous expecta-
tions models of stock pricing that assume incomplete markets; 
second, we consider the implications of a basic source of mar-
ket incompleteness, asymmetric information; and third, we 
look at market power as another source of market incomplete-
ness that introduces pricing distortions into the market on an 
everyday basis. 
1. Heterogeneous Expectations 
The economics of heterogeneous expectations explains ex-
treme variance between market price and fundamental value 
that occurs in a pricing bubble.  In this depiction, each investor 
holds the same set of information but develops her own esti-
mate of fundamental value, with some investors being more 
optimistic than others.  Note that this description assumes 
market incompleteness and unspannable assets, under which 
investors cannot value new projects by extrapolating projec-
tions from existing assets.  Given either complete markets or 
spannable assets, investors could only have homogenous 
expectations. 
More particularly, heterogeneous expectations models de-
pict stock prices as having two components: first, the funda-
mental value of the stock; and second, an option which gives 
the present owner the power to sell its stock to an even more 
optimistic investor.139  The result is that, in equilibrium, the 
stock price may exceed the fundamental value as optimistic 
investors may be willing to pay a higher price for the stock 
because of the option value of selling the stock to an even more 
optimistic investor.140 
138 See Pradeep Dubey et al., The Revelation of Information in Strategic Market 
Games: A Critique of Rational Expectation Equilibrium, 16 J. MATHEMATICAL ECON. 
105, 105–07 (1987). 
139 For the original model, see J. Michael Harrison & David M. Kreps, Specula-
tive Investor Behavior in a Stock Market with Heterogeneous Expectations, 92 Q.J. 
ECON. 323, 328–29 (1978).  For a more recent treatment, see José A. Scheinkman 
& Wei Xiong, Overconfidence and Speculative Bubbles, 111 J. POL. ECON. 1183, 
1194 (2003). 
140 The more pronounced the differences of opinion among investors, the more 
salient the speculative element. See Patrick Bolton et al., Executive Compensation 
and Short-Termist Behavior in Speculative Markets, 73 REV. ECON. STUD. 577, 
578–80 (2006). 
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There are several implications.  First, the market price no 
longer reflects the investment community’s consensus esti-
mate of the fundamental value of the firm.141  This undercuts a 
critical assumption made by the EMH—that competition 
among rational investors causes prices to center around an 
average of expected fundamental value.142  Second, the market 
price is being driven by demand rather than by information, in 
what amounts to short-term speculation.  Third, to the extent 
the resulting market overvaluation affects investment behavior 
within the corporation, bad investments will result.143 
Cognizable discrepancies between market price and funda-
mental value due to heterogeneous expectations are particu-
larly likely to result in two situations.  The first occurs when 
“glamour” companies exciting investor optimism emerge in the 
market, a situation associated with “momentum” investing.144 
The second situation occurs when uncertainty runs high be-
cause a sector’s technology changes or newer businesses with 
less established track records become an important part of the 
market.145  In other words, price tends to depart from funda-
mental value when the project is unspannable, just as GE 
predicts. 
2. Information Asymmetries 
Under the assumption of market incompleteness, the 
EMH’s conclusion that long-term value is impounded in the 
present market price is further problematized by information 
asymmetries.  While EMH models do not consider market in-
completeness, they do acknowledge the relevance of asymmet-
ric information between firm insiders and outsiders, by 
distinguishing between a “strong” and “semi-strong” version. 
Semi-strong EMH posits that the capital markets embed all 
publicly available information in security prices.146  The limita-
141 See Giovanni Cespa & Xavier Vives, Dynamic Trading and Asset Prices: 
Keynes vs. Hayek, 79 REV. ECON. STUD. 539, 539–40 (2012) 
142 Id. 
143 Bratton & Wachter, supra note 61, at 711–12. 
144 See Bruno Biais, Peter Bossaerts & Chester Spatt, Equilibrium Asset Pricing 
and Portfolio Choice Under Asymmetric Information, 23 REV. FIN. STUD. 1503, 
1529–32 (2010). 
145 See Bolton et al., supra note 140, at 578–80; Stavros Panageas, The Neo-
classical Theory of Investment in Speculative Markets 22–23 (Apr. 16, 2005) 
(unpublished manuscript), http://ssrn.com/abstract=720464 [https:// 
perma.cc/F64D-NYS2]. 
146 See Malkiel, supra note 38, at 739, cited in JOHN Y. CAMPBELL ET AL., THE 
ECONOMETRICS OF FINANCIAL MARKETS 20 (1997).  Semi-strong EMH has two implica-
tions: first, that no trading strategy based on public information can regularly 
outperform the market, id. at 158, and, second, that insiders who possess non-
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tion to public information leaves semi-strong EMH coexisting 
at peace with the proposition that undisclosed inside informa-
tion can lead to significant under- and over-pricing in the 
market.147 
Semi-strong EMH does not, however, go on to explore the 
distortionary possibilities, including inefficient investment pol-
icy,148 following from information asymmetries.  Consider a 
firm with an opportunity to take on an unspannable project—a 
new, complicated, and very promising investment in a non-
standardized, innovative technology in which production re-
quires firm-specific employee investment.  Such a project is 
likely to be mispriced in the stock market.149  There are two 
reasons.  First, information about the project’s long-term value 
tends to be “soft”—that is, unverifiable by outsiders.150  Sec-
ond, the project is likely to entail both a substantial present 
commitment of capital and a long-time lag between the time of 
investment and the time that returns from the project enhance 
the firm’s periodic earnings reports.  The result is a drop in 
current earnings, a piece of “hard” information that pushes 
down the stock price.151  Given managers who cater to the 
stock price to minimize the risk of activist intervention, a good 
investment opportunity is likely to be passed up.152 
3. Market Power 
Until recently, situations in which the market price departs 
from fundamental value due to speculative demand by inves-
tors with market power (investors who are price makers, rather 
public information can outperform the market when trading in their own stock. 
See Dirk Jenter, Market Timing and Management Portfolio Decisions, 60 J. FIN. 
1903, 1945–46 (2005); Lisa K. Meulbroek, An Empirical Analysis of Illegal Insider 
Trading, 47 J. FIN. 1661, 1692 (1992). 
147 See Bratton & Wachter, supra note 61, 691–94. 
148 Id. at 698–703. 
149 See Andrei Shleifer & Robert W. Vishny, Equilibrium Short Horizons of 
Investors and Firms, 80 AM. ECON. REV. (PAPERS & PROC.) 148, 148 (1990); Stein, 
Takeover Threats, supra note 7, at 63–67.  Under some assumptions, the project 
may well be undervalued—e.g., if investors in equilibrium believe the manager to 
be a bad type. See Simone M. Sepe, Board and Shareholder Power, Revisited, 101 
MINN. L. REV. 1377, 1412–16 (2017). 
150 See, e.g., JEAN TIROLE, THE THEORY OF CORPORATE FINANCE 250 (2006) (defin-
ing “soft” information as that which “cannot be verified by the investors”). 
151 Alex Edmans et al., The Real Costs of Financial Efficiency When Some 
Information Is Soft, 20 REV. FIN. 2151, 2152 (2016). 
152 See M.P. Narayanan, Managerial Incentives for Short-Term Results, 40 J. 
FIN. 1469, 1469–70 (1985) (showing that reputational incentives can lead to un-
derinvestment); Stein, Efficient Capital Markets, supra note 7, at 667 (modeling 
suboptimal investment where managers maximize a weighted average of near-
term stock prices and long run value). 
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than price takers) were thought to be relatively rare.  This view 
is changing.  Current research emphasizes that under heterog-
enous expectations and differential investor information, bet-
ter-informed investors may rationally choose to exploit their 
partly private information and act as price-makers rather than 
price-takers by speculating on short-run price differences.153 
The partial equilibrium model of Cespa and Vives offers a 
particularly good example.  It is an integrated model in which 
the everyday stock market moves back and forth between infor-
mationally based and speculative pricing.154  They posit a ra-
tional expectations environment, long-term time horizons, and 
residual uncertainty about asset values that varies in magni-
tude from company to company.155  They show that a static 
market conforms to the prediction of EMH, with the price re-
flecting the investors’ consensus opinion regarding long-term 
value.  In a dynamic market, however, rational investors can 
find it profitable to speculate on short-term price differentials. 
Price now depends not only on the quality of the investors’ 
information but on their reaction to changes in aggregate de-
mand.156  The latter can cause the price to move away from the 
consensus figure.  Given heterogeneous information, this non-
consensus price can lie farther from or closer to fundamental 
value than would the consensus price. 
At this point two additional factors come to bear: the de-
gree of uncertainty respecting value and the magnitude of the 
presence of liquidity traders.  Given low uncertainty and trad-
ing following a random walk, the price will be aligned with 
consensus as in a static market and there will be little incentive 
to speculate on short-term price movement.  We would be, in 
effect, back at a spannable project.  Given high uncertainty, 
departures from the value consensus are more likely.157  Inter-
estingly, momentum investing, which is triggered by new infor-
mation, can push the price away from fundamental value even 
as it reflects a consensus view of value.158  Ironically, the cor-
rective—reversal of the overpricing stemming from trend chas-
ing—comes from traders who act based on supply-demand 
considerations.159  The bottom line assertion is this: whether 
153 MAS-COLELL ET AL., supra note 10, at 715. 
154 Cespa & Vives, supra note 141, at 540–41. 
155 Id. at 540. 
156 Id. at 541. 
157 Id. at 540. 
158 See Biais, supra note 144, at 1532 (showing how momentum can arise in 
equilibrium). 
159 Cespa & Vives, supra note 141, at 541. 
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the market is moving forward with momentum or reverting, it is 
the investors’ consensus opinions about future price move-
ments rather than fundamental value that drive the price.160 
Happily, the Cespa-Vives model predicts a reversion to fun-
damental value in the very long run.  In the meantime, we no 
longer can model a unitary shareholder.  The shareholder dis-
aggregates among short-term types, long-term types, informa-
tion traders, and liquidity traders.  There is accordingly no 
basis for presuming that shareholder incentives are aligned 
with maximization of fundamental value and hence that share-
holder empowerment adds value.  Instead, shareholder em-
powerment holds out plusses and minuses.  GE, read together 
with the asset pricing literature, inserts a warning into this 
trade-off picture: the more powerful the shareholders become, 
the more salient will be the negative effect of market ineffi-
ciency.  The warning is especially loud whenever a corpora-
tion’s business plan involves valuation uncertainty.  This is a 
consistent message, whether one is considering GE, informa-
tion asymmetries under semi-strong EMH, or asset pricing the-
ory.  It means that activism is most suited to twentieth century 
brick and mortar producers and ill-suited to the younger, inno-
vative companies on which depends the future of our national 
economy. 
None of this negates the basic conclusion of incentive the-
ory that investors have an incentive to monitor and should use 
the stock price in so doing.161  Having investors as monitors— 
rather than as production decision-makers—is normatively de-
sirable and not inconsistent with GE and its incomplete mar-
kets.  Even as GE tells us that we cannot use market prices to 
guide production decisions, the price system still provides use-
ful information with which to monitor corporate decision mak-
ers.  For example, if prices are low for too long, we do get a 
likely signal that something is wrong.  The operative assump-
tion—which is consistent both with GE with incomplete mar-
kets and contemporary asset pricing theory—is that prices over 
time converge to fundamental value.  It follows that while 
prices cannot provide guidance on prospective production deci-
sion-making, they can be useful for the ex-post monitoring of 
corporate decisions. 
160 Id. at 541–42. 
161 See Jean Tirole, Corporate Governance, 69 ECONOMETRICA 1, 18–23 (2001) 
(modelling shareholder monitoring incentives). 
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D. Agency Capitalism Compared 
We conclude our discussion in this Part by addressing the 
different picture of markets advanced by Gilson and Gordon’s 
agency capitalism analysis.  Their analysis focuses on market 
completeness and contrasts sharply with our application of GE 
with incomplete markets.  They argue, making implicit refer-
ence to the A-D model,162 that the markets have achieved com-
pleteness, thereby supporting a positive normative 
presumption favoring shareholder empowerment precisely be-
cause it is market driven.163 
Gilson and Gordon situate the power shift within a longer-
term account of the evolution of interaction between capital 
markets and governance institutions.  The shift, they say, re-
flects a long-standing pattern: markets take the lead in adjust-
ing to new developments, while institutions, weighted down by 
frictions, anomalies, and path dependencies, catch up later.164 
The facilitative market-based developments concern alloca-
tions of corporate risk, as to which capital markets in recent 
decades have managed to achieve completeness, offering new 
ways to transfer risk from firms to investors.165  Market inno-
vations like junk bond financing, derivatives, and structured 
finance over time have had a critical impact on corporate gov-
ernance because they open up new ways of transferring corpo-
rate risk and permitting more leverage in capital structures.166 
Stepped-up leverage in turn facilitates the emergence of the 
new activist blockholders and a different alignment of corpo-
rate control.167  Between the hedge fund activists and the large 
number of companies controlled by private equity firms, we 
now have a permanent class of informed, institutional inves-
tors influencing business policy.  Add this up, and you get a 
claim for efficient, market-driven evolution. 
Gilson and Gordon’s analysis picks up on a suggestion J-M 
themselves made at the close of their famous paper, where they 
discussed general equilibrium theory and the market incom-
162 In an earlier paper, Gilson on this subject explicitly connected the notion to 
the A-D model, citing it as “[t]he theoretical framework for the implications of 
complete capital markets.” See Ronald J. Gilson & Charles K. Whitehead, Decon-
structing Equity: Public Ownership, Agency Costs, and Complete Capital Markets, 
108 COLUM. L. REV. 231, 232 n.7 (2008). 
163 Gilson & Gordon, supra note 52, at 865–68, 874. 
164 Id. at 873.  With this compare the analysis of Holmstrom and Kaplan, 
supra note 54. 
165 Gilson & Gordon, supra note 52, at 868. 
166 Id. at 870–71. 
167 Id. at 870–71, 872 n.30. 
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pleteness problem.  J-M expressed dissatisfaction with the 
literature’s accumulation of inefficient outcomes.  So, instead 
of just assuming market incompleteness as in GE, the time had 
come to take action: economists needed to ascertain the causes 
of incompleteness and formulate a positive analysis of the sup-
ply of markets, highlighting conditions conducive to the crea-
tion of real world markets.168  Gilson and Gordon make a 
follow-up observation: J-M’s market completion project has 
been carried out in history and completed successfully.  The 
notion is intuitive: more is better than less, so the longer the 
menu of risk-sharing securities, the better the market satisfies 
individual preferences, and the stronger the economy.169 
Even so, the notion is not GE.  Indeed, GE views the pro-
cess of opening new markets with suspicion.  Hart showed 
mathematically in an incomplete market setup that the open-
ing of a new market triggered a new equilibrium that made 
everyone worse off.170  The result has been replicated and gen-
eralized.171  And, in any event, we do not think that the invest-
ment community’s recent attribution of value to the 
shareholder franchise has a market-completing effect.  Aggres-
sive use of the franchise does diminish the negative effects of 
management moral hazard and so ameliorates an imperfection. 
It thereby may (or may not) create value, but it does not add a 
market.  In fact, shareholder empowerment arguably entails an 
increase in market incompleteness because it turns intermedi-
ary moral hazard into a potential problem for the first time. 
When the shareholders were disempowered, the in-
168 The exact quote from J-M reads as follows: 
We are not suggesting that the specific analysis offered above is 
likely to be sufficient to lead to a theory of the supply of the wide 
range of contracts (both existing and merely potential) in the world 
at large.  However, we do believe that framing the question of the 
completeness of markets in terms of the joining of both the demand 
and supply conditions will be very fruitful instead of implicitly as-
suming that new claims spring forth from some (costless) well head 
of creativity unaided or unsupported by human effort. 
Jensen & Meckling, supra note 4, at 356–57. 
169 See Hart, supra note 108, at 419 (“Our intuition tells us that the introduc-
tion of additional markets ought to make people better off in some sense.”). 
170 Id. at 439–42. 
171 See Ronel Elul, Welfare Effects of Financial Innovation in Incomplete Mar-
kets Economies with Several Consumption Goods, 65 J. ECON. THEORY 43, 43 
(1995).  A suboptimal outcome, however, is not always inevitable—sometimes the 
new market does make everyone better off. See Laurent Calvet, Martı́n Gonzalez-
Eiras & Paolo Sodini, Financial Innovation, Market Participation, and Asset Prices, 
39 J. FIN. & QUAN. ANALYSIS 431, 431 (2004); David Cass & Alessandro Citanna, 
Pareto Improving Financial Innovation in Incomplete Markets, 11 ECON. THEORY 
467, 467 (1998). 
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termediaries’ incentives did not matter.  With direct inputs into 
production plans, intermediary incentives matter a lot. 
The growth of intermediaries also implies enhanced inter-
mediary power to influence stock market prices.  Such is the 
effect of ownership reconcentration.  As predicted by Cespa and 
Vives, the increase in market power potentially makes market 
prices less accurate.172  When there are more possible equilib-
ria out there in the future, it follows that the price prediction 
function is performed with less accuracy. 
Gilson and Gordon are correct when they point out that the 
appearance of new devices for corporate risk-sharing and the 
proliferation of new investment institutions, principally private 
equity firms and hedge funds, have changed the nature of 
shareholding.  The changes do indeed reduce agency costs. 
But they have not completed the markets.  Full insurance re-
garding future states remains unavailable and the corporate-
level changes identified by Gilson and Gordon do not obviate 
the results of GE models and deliver us to a world that realizes 
Arrow-Debreu.  There is accordingly no basis in economic the-
ory for attaching an efficiency presumption. 
IV 
LEGAL RAMIFICATIONS 
Our analysis yields three major points: 
(i) As corporate ownership has become concentrated in the 
hands of institutional and active investors, power has 
shifted from managers to shareholders, vesting decision-
making capability in the shareholders for the first time. 
The shift appears to be permanent; there will be no re-
turn to the insulated hierarchical corporation. 
(ii) Contrary to the general assumption that markets can 
efficiently coordinate corporate production, GE predicts 
that when shareholders make business decisions, equi-
libria are likely to be multiple and inefficient.  This im-
plies that shareholder intervention in business planning 
imports a trade-off between positive effects due to con-
tainment of management agency costs and negative ef-
fects of market inefficiency. 
(iii) Economic theory provides general results on how to or-
ganize firms separately from markets (the Coasean the-
ory of the firm) and general results on markets (GE). 
However, the shift of decision-making power to share-
172 See Cespa & Vives, supra note 141. 
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holders transforms the corporation into a hybrid form 
that straddles the firm and the markets.173 
We now turn now to the legal ramifications of these points, 
looking first, in subpart IV.A, at the negative normative mes-
sage of GE for corporate governance, then turning, in subpart 
IV.B, to the formulation of policy recommendations for corpo-
rate legal theory, and finally considering corporate law, as in-
terpreted and enforced in Delaware. 
A. The Negative Normative Message of GE 
Like most law and economics scholars, we are consequen-
tialist.  We thus share the view that corporate law should assist 
the maximization of aggregate social welfare.174  Our interven-
tion, however, teaches that we cannot rely on normative indica-
tions derived from microeconomic theory to advance that goal. 
This is unfortunate, for clear theoretical guidance makes life 
easier.  If microeconomics could provide a general theory of the 
corporation—a theory offering robust results on the tradeoff 
between agency costs and market inefficiency—a regulatory 
template would follow readily.  For example, if we had general 
results on the welfare increasing properties of market coordi-
nation, then the consequential policy would be to forbid the 
board to implement any defense against market intervention 
and to accord enhanced governance powers to shareholders. 
Similarly, if we had results globally favoring the corporation as 
a centralized and insulated bureaucracy, the consequential 
policy would be to give all the bargaining power to the board, 
along with an unassailable right to adopt defensive measures. 
We would in either case have a much better idea of where we 
stand. 
Unfortunately, however, public corporations have evolved 
into hybrids.  The analysis here shows that higher-order eco-
nomic theory—GE with incomplete markets—fails to tell us 
how to work through the trade-offs implicated by the hybrid 
173 We note that Williamson posits an intermediate category. See Oliver E. 
Williamson, The Theory of the Firm as Governance Structure: From Choice to Con-
tract, 16 J. ECON. PERSP. 171, 180–81 (2002).  But, in our view, today’s share-
holder-directed public corporations are not the firm described in Williamson’s 
intermediate category, but the firm described in his hierarchy category. 
174 As put by Kaplow and Shavell, “Welfare economics . . . is consequentialist 
in nature, because welfare economic assessments of legal rules depend (entirely) 
on the effects of the rules. . . . [I]t is based (exclusively) on a particular set of 
consequences, namely, those that bear on individuals’ well-being.” Louis Kaplow 
& Steven Shavell, Fairness Versus Welfare, 114 HARV. L. REV. 961, 969 n.8 (2001). 
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form.175  This does not mean that our analysis leaves nothing 
on the table for corporate law and economics.  The teaching is 
negative, but important; it involves a presumption against pro-
posals in favor of either shareholder empowerment, or, alterna-
tively, management insulation.  Both proposals lack support in 
economic theory and have distortionary effects in practice. 
While the economic theory of incentives does indeed assert that 
agency cost reduction enhances value, GE denudes the asser-
tion of policy salience when it shows that shareholder inputs 
regarding production choices can have suboptimal results. 
Contrariwise, a policy presumption against shareholder em-
powerment could be prima facie taken to follow from GE.  A 
closer look, however, reveals that management moral hazard, 
which is indirectly modeled in GE as a source of market incom-
pleteness, remains in the picture, similarly preventing an an-
tishareholder presumption from arising. 
The negative presumption makes law reform very hard to 
justify.  This conclusion bears devastating implications for the 
law reform agenda articulated pursuant to the market control 
paradigm—a list of legislative and administrative interventions 
designed to jumpstart shareholder empowerment.176  The 
agenda clearly needs to be shelved, and not only because it 
lacks theoretical support.  It also has been mooted by events. 
Shareholders are now empowered in fact and need no regula-
tory assistance.  The fact that power flowed to them in the 
absence of root and branch law reform is telling.177  It turns out 
175 In philosophy, the term “theoretical reason” is used to refer to a standpoint 
of reflection that is directed at finding explanations for matters of fact.  Jay R. 
Wallace, Practical Reason, in THE STANFORD ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PHILOSOPHY (Edward 
N. Zalta ed., Summer ed. 2014), https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/sum2014/ 
entries/practical-reason/ [https://perma.cc/W6Z7-EQHJ]. 
To search for explanations behind facts is to seek to answer normative ques-
tions that speak for or against particular conclusions one might draw about the 
way the world is.  That is, theoretical reason involves reflection with an eye to the 
truth of propositions, to the ultimate end of building a system of norms regulating 
beliefs.  In the current corporate environment, however, we lack a theory that can 
offer “truth propositions” that tell us the best way to structure the corporation ex 
ante. 
176 See Bratton & Wachter, supra note 61, at 669–73. 
177 This does not go to say that law reform has played no role in the shift of 
shareholder-management power.  It is just that the law in question is not corpo-
rate law but federal securities law.  Two adjustments have played a significant 
facilitative role.  One went to the proxy rules, which do a lot of the heavy lifting 
regarding the shareholder franchise.  In 1992, the Securities and Exchange Com-
mission (SEC) modified the rules so as to permit short slates. See Regulation of 
Communications Among Shareholders, 57 Fed. Reg. 48,276, 48,289 (Oct. 16, 
1992) (codified at 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-4).  The modification long antedated hedge 
fund activism, but, when the occasion finally arose, opened a process door for 
hostile engagement short of control transfer.  The second change came in 2003, 
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that the system was never as embedded as the shareholder 
paradigm predicted. 
B. From Market Control to Off-Market Contracting 
Given the lack of a clear normative theory for the new hy-
brid corporation, the question is what alternative palliative 
microeconomic theory offers to corporate legal theory.  We an-
swer that one needs good incentives prodded by effective con-
tracts.  Given incomplete markets, economic theory counsels 
that contracting that directs incentives in the proper direction 
is a more promising route to productive efficiency than is mar-
ket control.  There follows a second presumption in favor of 
private ordering, as the means to enable market actors to ade-
quately address the specific tradeoffs between agency cost and 
market inefficiency. 
While it is hard to make predictions on the directions that 
manager-shareholders’ private bargaining will take, our private 
view, supported by recent empirical evidence,178  is that bar-
gaining for additional insulation from shareholder attack 
clearly will be value-enhancing at some companies some of the 
time.  To this end, there is already a toolbox of devices individ-
ual companies can include in their charters—staggered 
boards, supermajority voting provisions, and tenure voting 
schemes.  We expect the collection to grow in coming years as 
the inevitable outcome of off-market contracting in the wake of 
shareholder empowerment and predict that structural reform 
will occur at individual companies. 
Corporate actors may not yet fully appreciate the negative 
possibilities held out by the trade-off between agency costs and 
when the SEC imposed on investment advisors a duty to vote portfolio shares on a 
considered basis and in the beneficiary’s best interests. See SEC Proxy Voting by 
Investment Advisors, 17 C.F.R. pt. 275, Release No. IA-2106 (Mar. 10, 2003).  This 
mandate deprived management of a built-in base of voting support.  It also en-
hanced the influence of informational intermediaries like ISS and Glass Lewis, 
who met a sudden increase in demand for voting advice emanating from smaller 
advisors for whom internal decision-making on voting was not cost effective.  If we 
set these adjustments against the broader background of corporate law and se-
curities regulation, we see that shareholder empowerment required very little in 
the way of a regulatory assist. 
178 See, e.g.,  Cremers & Sepe, supra note 61, at 100–08 (documenting an 
increase in value after the adoption of a staggered board, especially in more 
innovative firms, firms with more intangibles, and firms with more stable stake-
holder relationships); William C. Johnson et al., The Bonding Hypothesis of Take-
over Defenses: Evidence from IPO Firms, 117 J. FIN. ECON. 307, 320–25 (2015) 
(empirically documenting that in IPO firms, takeover defenses reduce the possibil-
ity that a change in control will harm the firm’s stakeholders, promoting more 
favorable contracting terms and increasing firm value). 
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market inefficiency.  But the actors’ reaction sets and govern-
ance prescriptions can be expected to change as the set of 
results expands and contractual settlements accumulate and 
evolve.  There already are signs that institutional investors are 
taking a more nuanced view of activist intervention.179  Share-
holder response patterns have changed in recent years.  Proxy 
contest outcomes no longer unilaterally favor activists.180 
Large institutional investors, even as they invoke the rubric of 
management “engagement” to get seats at the business plan-
ning table,181 also express support for the long-term plans of 
companies against activist attacks and withhold support for 
activists who primarily seek to force companies into share 
buybacks and extraordinary distributions.182  We are hopeful 
that boards of directors and institutional investors can learn 
from experience and cooperate in implementing protections 
against destructive intervention.183 
179 See SULLIVAN & CROMWELL LLP, supra note 59, at 4–6.  This new trend on 
the side of investors rejects a contractarian objection that our contractual ap-
proach is likely to invite—the “if there’s a problem they can just make a contract 
and if they haven’t already done so there can’t be a problem” argument.  Under 
this argument, if shareholder power actually implicated inefficiencies, we should 
expect to see contractual constraints on shareholder power to be in place already. 
See Bebchuk, supra note 51, at 1683–84; Roe, supra note 51, at 987–89.  How-
ever, while we are beginning to see these constraints, in an imperfect world one 
need not expect the widespread adoption of contracts that limit shareholder 
power to happen right away.  There are path dependencies aplenty in the world of 
corporate governance, not the least of them fixed views regarding the positive 
productivity implications of shareholder inputs and the presence of influential 
governance intermediaries with vested interests in those views’ continued preva-
lence.  In short, the absence of more contracting to contain shareholders does not 
imply that shareholder power is not a problem. 
180 DuPont’s defensive victory in 2015 is the leading example. See, e.g., Ste-
phen Gandel, DuPont’s Victory: A Big Win for Ellen Kullman, but Activist Investors 
Aren’t Finished, FORTUNE (May 23, 2015), http://fortune.com/2015/05/13/du-
pont-ellen-kullman-shareholder-activism/ [https://perma.cc/2CQA-AAL8] 
(describing how, after a four-month proxy fight, DuPont prevailed against activists 
led by a billionaire hedge-fund manager). 
181 See supra note 59 and accompanying text. 
182 This was in BlackRock chairman Larry Fink’s 2016 letter to CEOs. See 
Ben McLannahan, Fink Backs New Breed of Shareholder Activism, FIN. TIMES 
(Feb. 5, 2016), https://www.ft.com/content/5f05b082-cbd3-11e5-84df-70594b 
99fc47 [https://perma.cc/MM43-WAXN]. 
183 We anticipate an anticontractual objection: that the contracts in the firm 
nexus are intrinsically incomplete and that therefore contract cannot be relied 
upon to avoid inefficiencies.  Tirole noted that there is a completeness question 
bound up in his governance creation story but signaled that he did not think there 
is a problem. See Tirole, supra note 161, at 14.  A contingent control transfer can 
be set up without a projection of all future contingencies. See Eric Maskin & Jean 
Tirole, Unforeseen Contingencies and Incomplete Contracts, 66 REV. ECON. STUD. 
83, 84 (1999), which sets out a foundational critique to incomplete contracts 
providing an irrelevance theorem.  They make a very simple point: “If parties have 
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Our recommendation for a presumption favoring private 
ordering recalls the E-F contractarian paradigm of the 1980s. 
But the similarity is more apparent than real.184  In E-F’s pic-
ture, market inputs assure efficient results from private con-
tracting.185  Under GE, in contrast, private contracting offers a 
corrective response to the inefficiencies arising in incomplete 
markets.  The notion is that governance terms grounded in 
shareholder-manager contracting and business decisions 
made within such a negotiated governance framework will be 
superior to governance terms and business decisions resulting 
from direct shareholder inputs in incomplete markets. 
Superior, but not necessarily efficient.  In bargaining the-
ory, control goes to the party with the bargaining power 
whether or not the outcome is optimal.  It follows that the pos-
sibility of contracting does not preclude suboptimal outcomes. 
More particularly, bargaining theory teaches that the disagree-
ment point of the bargaining parties determines the outcome. 
If one party has a disagreement point that is “too low” relative 
to the other party, the counterparty will be in a position sub-
stantially to determine the outcome.  As applied to the current 
corporate scenario, this means that if, for example, a manager 
fears removal from the activist investors, she will be more likely 
to give in to any investor requests because the threat of removal 
ensures that the manager has a low disagreement point.186  Yet 
trouble foreseeing the possible physical contingencies, they can write contracts 
that ex ante specify only the possible payoff contingencies.” Id. 
184 We do, however, keep market constraints in the picture, as in E-F.  Thus, 
product markets can still be relied upon to import production discipline, the stock 
market to facilitate investor monitoring of firm decisions, and the market for 
management employment to lead to contracts that direct management incentives 
in productive directions. 
185 In E-F, this result comes from the combination of pure shareholder incen-
tives, the claim of market price accuracy, and the reliance on a takeover correc-
tive. See supra section I.B.2.  We, of course, drop insistence on any of these 
claims. 
186 The leading partial equilibrium model of contractual corporate govern-
ance—Jean Tirole’s retelling of the J-M creation story—formally explores the pos-
sibility of suboptimal outcomes from shareholder-management bargaining, 
concluding that shareholder-generated production decisions might be “biased.” 
See Tirole, supra note 161, at 8–13.  In Tirole, just as in J-M, the moment of 
creation is the moment the entrepreneur takes the firm public, with the yield to 
the entrepreneur and the firm rising or falling depending on the availability of 
devices that reduce agency costs. Id.  Tirole, however, extends J-M analysis, 
describing shareholder monitoring in detail and bringing in control transfer. Id. 
at 13–16.  Once the possibility of control transfer comes into Tirole’s model, an 
interesting thing happens: the need to raise capital at creation can lead the 
founder-manager to give up control to the investors even though the investors will 
make inefficient choices. Id. at 15.  The shareholders seek to maximize their own 
returns, which are not collinear with overall value maximization (exactly as pre-
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the opposite may also hold.  For example, if a board success-
fully entrenches itself, it may instrumentally use defensive 
measures to force decisions on shareholders. 
Therefore, today’s challenge is to avoid systemic domi-
nance by one contracting party—whether the managers or the 
shareholders—and the inefficient distortion of the bargaining 
process that results. 
C. Delaware Adjudication and the New Hybrid Corporation 
Our last prediction is that corporate law, as interpreted 
and enforced in Delaware, is well suited to the mediation of 
future bargaining between managers and empowered inves-
tors.  Delaware courts have never imposed maximizing direc-
tives based on economic theory.  Instead, they leave the basic 
alignment of power between managers and shareholders to the 
parties themselves and only review the bargaining process on 
an ex-post, case-by-case basis when problems arise.  Delaware 
courts excel at this pragmatic exercise, drawing on a variety of 
analytical devices in their decision-making, including common 
sense, insights from economics, empirical results, historical 
comparison, and logical inference.  This excellence—and hence 
Delaware’s superior ability to mediate shareholder-manager 
conflicts—follows from a distinctive feature of the Delaware’s 
judiciary system: the central role played by equitable 
adjudication. 
1. Delaware’s Equity Model 
Modern equity has its historical roots in feudal England.  It 
reaches back to the time when the English Crown established 
the High Court of Chancery of Great Britain187 to provide a 
remedy in cases where parties would have suffered a wrong 
because of the procedural rigidity or practical problems affect-
dicted by GE).  The control transfer thus sacrifices enterprise value.  In the model, 
the only way the founder-manager can be insulated from suboptimal investor 
interference is to have a sufficient ex ante base of capital that tilts the bargaining 
power its way at the IPO contracting table. Id. at 16, 30. 
187 See William T. Quillen & Michael Hanrahan, A Short History of the Dela-
ware Court of Chancery—1792–1992, 18 DEL. J. CORP. L. 819, 819 (1993).  Equity 
evolved in feudal England as a natural outgrowth of the King’s inherent power and 
duty to do justice, as people could directly petition the King for aid when they 
could not obtain adequate relief from a local court. JOHN H. LANGBEIN ET AL., 
HISTORY OF THE COMMON LAW: THE DEVELOPMENT OF ANGLO-AMERICAN LEGAL INSTITU-
TIONS 18–19, 90–91 (2009).  The office of the Chancellor, and then the Chancery 
Court, developed by 1400 to alleviate the need for people to seek relief directly 
from the King and his council. See Michael T. Morley, The Federal Equity Power, 
59 B.C. L. REV. 217, 226 (2018). 
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ing the application of the common law.188  This emphasis on 
providing relief suited to the circumstances when no adequate 
remedy is available at law remains a central feature of the 
Delaware Court of Chancery, the nation’s preeminent business 
court.189 
Indeed, while equity adjudication is a constitutive compo-
nent of American corporate law as articulated in every state,190 
Delaware is among the few states that have not moved toward a 
consolidation of law and equity jurisdictions in the same 
courts, but rather maintains a separate court of equity.191 
Under this separation, the Chancery Court has exclusive juris-
diction to hear and determine cases involving equitable rights 
(such as trusts and fiduciary duties)192 and equitable remedies 
(such as injunctions and specific performance).193  The Chan-
cery Court also has nonexclusive jurisdiction over suits involv-
188 The paradigmatic example was the English Chancellors’ grant of “common 
injunctions” against the collection of judgments on sealed instruments issued by 
law courts, at the time when these courts refused to recognize fraud as a defense 
to an action on a sealed instrument.  In fraud cases, the petitioner would thus ask 
the Chancellor not to overturn or invalidate the law court’s judgment, but instead 
to enjoin the judgment creditor from enforcing the judgment, because enforce-
ment under the circumstances would be unfair.  Jack B. Jacobs, The Uneasy 
Truce Between Law and Equity in Modern Business Enterprise Jurisprudence, 8 
DEL. L. REV. 1, 4–5 (2005). Other paradigmatic cases of inadequacy of the com-
mon law to provide a remedy included, for example, the fact that a plaintiff was 
unable to satisfy a technical element or evidentiary requirement for obtaining 
relief at law, or that the common law lacked a writ for the harm the plaintiff had 
suffered, or still that a common-law jury could be prejudiced against the plaintiff. 
See David W. Raack, A History of Injunctions in England Before 1700, 61 IND. L.J. 
539, 555–58 (1986). 
189 See Quillen & Hanrahan, supra note 187, at 819. 
190 See, e.g., Stuart R. Cohn, Corporate Natural Law: The Dominance of Justice 
in a Codified World, 48 FLA. L. REV. 551, 552 (1996) (“[E]quitable principles rather 
than statutes and other seemingly authoritative sources answer many of the most 
substantial corporate law questions.”).  For a thorough discussion of the use of 
equitable remedies in current American law, see Samuel L. Bray, The System of 
Equitable Remedies, 63 UCLA L. REV. 530 (2016). 
191 See Quillen & Hanrahan, supra note 187, at 825–26 (explaining that Dela-
ware’s decision to create it Chancery Court in 1792 contradicted the historical 
trend of the time away from chancery courts).  It is unclear whether policy or 
pragmatic reasons motivated Delaware to move from a consolidated jurisdiction to 
separated systems of law and equity. See id. at 826–31. 
192 Trust and fiduciary duties have long been equity’s most important legal 
doctrines, whose development dates back to the jurisdiction of the English Chan-
cery Court. See id. at 821; Jacobs, supra note 188, at 5. 
193 DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 10, § 341.  Absent special statutory authorization, the 
Court of Chancery lacks jurisdiction “to determine any matter wherein sufficient 
remedy may be had by common law, or statute, before any other court or jurisdic-
tion of this State.” DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 10, § 342.  These matters belong, instead, 
to the Superior Court of Delaware, a court of law, which has “jurisdiction of all 
causes of a civil nature, real, personal and mixed, at common law[,]” as well as 
over criminal matters. DEL. CONST. art. IV, § 7. 
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ing Delaware’s General Corporation Law and other business 
entities, as well as business litigation involving charters, by-
laws and merger agreements.194 
The equity identity of the Chancery Court also means that 
the court has no jury trials, only bench trials.195  All cases are 
decided, and the underlying facts investigated, by the Chancel-
lor or Vice-Chancellor.  As equity adjudicators, the chancellors 
have wide latitude to craft remedies and mold earlier decisions 
to fit particular fact patterns.  Very much in the tradition of the 
Chancery Court’s English ancestor,196 Delaware’s chancellors 
are not bound by strict notions of precedent, but rather retain 
broad discretion to do justice in individual cases based on 
moral principles, standards of fairness, and flexible reme-
dies.197  This trait of equity decision-making198 gives Dela-
ware’s chancellors the ability to adapt the law to ever-changing 
economic circumstances and legal relationships. 
2. Equity’s Residual Indeterminacy 
The Chancery Court’s flexibility does not come without 
costs, though.  Discretion to undercut the future applicability 
194 DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 111(a); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 6, §§ 17-111, 18-111. 
Cases can be transferred between the Court of Chancery and the Superior Court 
to ensure the appropriate court relief. See, e.g., Candlewood Timber Group, LLC 
v. Pan Am. Energy, LLC, 859 A.2d 989, 997–98 (Del. 2004) (transferring a case 
from the Court of Chancery to the Superior Court upon concluding that the 
plaintiffs’ request for specific performance would not adequately remedy the envi-
ronmental damage that Pan American’s oil drilling allegedly caused to Can-
dlewood’s property in Argentina). 
195 See, e.g., Paron Capital Mgmt., LLC v. Crombie, No. 6380–VCP, 2012 WL 
214777, at *1 (Del. Ch. Jan. 24, 2012) (noting that “there are no jury trials in 
Chancery”); In re Del Monte Foods Co. S’holders Litig., No. 6027–VCL, 2010 WL 
5550677, at *2 (Del. Ch. Dec. 31, 2010) (stating a trial by jury is “not available in 
this Court”).  However, a little-used provision exists that authorizes the Court of 
Chancery to refer matters of fact in dispute to Superior Court for trial. DEL. CODE 
ANN. tit. 10, § 369; see also Norm Gershman’s Things to Wear, Inc. v. Dayon, No. 
11733, 1992 WL 368587, at *2 (Del. Ch. Dec. 11, 1992) (“I furthermore have the 
discretion to grant a jury trial on the liquated damages claim should I determine 
that it is warranted.”). 
196 John R. Kroger, Supreme Court Equity, 1789–1835, and the History of 
American Judging, 34 HOUS. L. REV. 1425, 1435 (1998).  It is worth noting, how-
ever, that the English system of equity was eventually assimilated to the common 
law system, through the use of binding precedents and more rigid court practices. 
Morley, supra note 187, at 229–30.  Delaware, in contrast, has carefully avoided 
to turn equity adjudication into a fixed system, bound by precedents and rigid 
principles, and instead preserved the original equity focus on specific holdings 
and ad hoc remedies.  Quillen & Hanrahan, supra note 187, at 821. 
197 William T. Allen, A Bicentennial Toast to the Delaware Court of Chancery 
1792–1992, 48 BUS. LAW. 363, 365 (1992). 
198 Id. (describing equity as “the dynamic, creative component of the judicial 
system”). 
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of precedents also makes the law less predictable, leading to a 
tension between flexibility and predictability.  The criticism 
that equity decisions may vary with the length of the Chancel-
lor’s foot has long been out there.199  More recent versions of 
this criticism suggest that Delaware purposefully maintains an 
excessive level of indeterminacy in its corporate law, whether to 
benefit the Delaware bar (as indeterminacy promotes litiga-
tion)200 or to maintain Delaware’s primacy in interstate compe-
tition (as indeterminacy makes the Delaware’s model more 
difficult to mimic).201 
We reject this criticism, making a two-part defence of Dela-
ware’s equitable adjudication.  First, the indeterminacy arising 
from Delaware’s equity decision-making is not as severe as 
portrayed by some commentators.  Second, and most impor-
tant for the purpose of this Article, Delaware’s approach is 
economically rational. 
(a) The matter of degree.  Academic discussions around the 
tension between flexibility and predictability in equity deci-
sions echo the wider corporate law debate on the merits of rules 
and standards as regulatory techniques.202  Rules favor pre-
dictability over flexibility, prescribing behavior ex ante and be-
ing typical of the “law model” of jurisprudence,203 under which 
what matters is the certainty of the system, even when it may 
occasionally produce “harsh result in individual cases.”204  By 
contrast, standards privilege flexibility, “leav[ing] discretion for 
adjudicators to determine ex post whether violations have oc-
curred,”205 thereby escaping the rigidity of bright-line rules. 
Commentators who criticize Delaware’s equity system for inde-
199 JOHN SELDEN, TABLE TALK 49 (BOOKS FOR LIBRARIES PRESS 1972) (1855). 
200 See Jonathan R. Macey & Geoffrey P. Miller, Toward an Interest-Group 
Theory of Delaware Corporate Law, 65 TEX. L. REV. 469, 491–98 (1987). 
201 See Ehud Kamar, A Regulatory Competition Theory of Indeterminacy in 
Corporate Law, 98 COLUM. L. REV. 1908, 1909 (1998). 
202 Henry E. Smith, An Economic Analysis of Law Versus Equity (Oct. 22, 
2010) (unpublished manuscript), https://law.yale.edu/sites/default/files/area/ 
workshop/leo/document/HSmith_LawVersusEquity7.pdf [https://perma.cc/ 
RV9U-SDNA].  For the canonical view on the rules vs. standards debate, see Louis 
Kaplow, Rules Versus Standards: An Economic Analysis, 42 DUKE L. REV. 557, 
568–96 (1992). 
203 See Jacobs, supra note 188, at 4 (contrasting the “law model” of corporate 
law with the “equity model”).  More particularly, in corporate law, rules are usu-
ally employed in matters that affect a corporation’s relationship with its creditors 
and investors, such as dividend restrictions, minimum capital requirements, 
tender offers, and proxy voting. See Henry Hansmann & Reinier Kraakman, 
Agency Problems and Legal Strategies, in THE ANATOMY OF CORPORATE LAW: A COM-
PARATIVE AND FUNCTIONAL APPROACH 24 (Reinier Kraakman et al. eds., 1st ed. 2004). 
204 See Jacobs, supra note 188, at 4. 
205 See Kraakman & Hansmann, supra note 203, at 24. 
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terminacy thus tend to describe it as centered around the “am-
ple use of vague standards.”206 
This characterization of the Delaware’s equity model, how-
ever, is misleading.  The Delaware judiciary works vigorously to 
minimize the uncertainty stemming from its decisions.  As put 
by former Justice (and Vice-Chancellor) Jacobs, Delaware 
judges, both on the Chancery and Supreme Courts, have ex-
erted a common effort “to create a ‘bright line’ around equity to 
enable practitioners and their clients to predict when otherwise 
legally valid corporate acts would become subject to equitable 
nullification.”207 They have done so through the progressive 
refinement of equitable doctrines, as articulated in both their 
reasoned  opinions and in the course of their extra-judicial ac-
tivities, which include frequent speeches and articles and par-
ticipation as policy makers in  professional organizations.208 
The appearance and evolution of the so-called heightened, 
or “intermediate,” scrutiny of a board’s actions offers a prime 
example of the effort made by the Delaware judiciary to make 
equity more predictable.  At first, Delaware only had two stan-
dards of review: the business judgement rule209 and the entire 
fairness test.210  Then the Delaware courts began to add con-
tent to (and guidance in the application of) the two stan-
206 Kamar, supra note 201, at 1909. 
207 See Jacobs, supra note 188, at 15.  Jacobs also reports the view of other 
commentators who suggest that, in brief, the bright line around equity mandates 
that “acts that comply with the corporate statute are subject to invalidation on 
equitable grounds, but equitable principles may not be used to salvage a corpo-
rate act that violates the corporate statute.” Id. (quoting Kurt M. Heyman & 
Christal Lint, Recent Developments in Corporate Law: Recent Supreme Court Re-
versals and the Role of Equity in Corporate Jurisprudence, 6 DEL. L. REV. 451, 487 
(2003)). 
208 See Myron T. Steele & J.W. Verrett, Delaware’s Guidance: Ensuring Equity 
for the Modern Witenagemot, 2 VA. L. & BUS. REV. 189, 192 (2007). 
209 The business judgment rule (BJR) presumption that the directors acted on 
an informed basis, in good faith, and in the interest of the company can only be 
rebutted if the board’s decision is irrational or the plaintiff can show a breach of 
the duty of care or loyalty, in which case the burden shifts to the directors to 
demonstrate that their action was fair to the corporation and its shareholders. 
See Aronson v. Lewis, 473 A.2d 805, 812 (Del. 1984); In re Walt Disney Co. 
Derivative Litig., 906 A.2d 27, 52 (Del. 2006). 
210 The entire fairness test is the most onerous standard of review of directorial 
conduct (i.e., standing at the opposite end of the spectrum of the BJR).  It applies 
whenever the directors propose or effect a transaction where they have a self-
interest which conflicts with that of the shareholders.  The paradigmatic case is 
an “interested” cash-out merger between a parent corporation and its subsidiary. 
See Jack B. Jacobs, Fifty Years of Corporate Law Evolution: A Delaware’s Judge 
Retrospective, 5 HARV. BUS. L. REV. 141, 155 (2015). 
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dards.211  Next, in response to the new realities and issues of 
the takeover era, came the creation of an entirely new, “inter-
mediate” set of principles in landmark cases such as Unocal212 
(and its further elaboration in Unitrin213), Revlon214 (and its 
further elaboration in Paramount v. QVC215), and Blasius,216 
with each subsequent case offering a refinement of the new 
heightened standards.217 
Granted, these principles are not exact.  But they are more 
predictable than those recognized by the critics of Delaware 
courts.  They amount to a tertium genus between rules and 
(vague) standards.218 
(b) Economic rationality. Delaware’s tertium genus leaves a 
residuum of indeterminacy in the adjudication of business liti-
gation.  But some level of indeterminacy should be welcomed as 
beneficial, in light of the indeterminate results yielded by eco-
nomic theory.  Recall that GE fails to tell us how to work 
211 For example, the entire fairness standard, which had been there since the 
inception of Delaware’s equity adjudication, lacked specific content that facili-
tated predicting the outcome of litigation until the decision in Weinberger v. UOP, 
Inc., when the Delaware Supreme Court specified that the inquiry into fairness 
would consider both the decision-making process and the transaction price. 
Weinberger v. UOP, Inc., 457 A.2d 701, 711 (Del. 1983).  For the subsequent 
evolution of the entire fairness standard, see Jacobs, supra note 210, at 155–60. 
212 Unocal Corp. v. Mesa Petroleum Co., 493 A.2d 946, 955 (Del. 1985).  In 
Unocal, the Delaware Supreme Court announced that the fiduciary propriety of a 
target company’s board’s adoption of antitakeover defenses would turn upon 
whether the board’s decision was a proportionate response to a reasonably per-
ceived threat. See id. 
213 Unitrin, Inc. v. Am. Gen. Corp., 651 A.2d 1361, 1367–68 (Del. 1995).  In 
Unitrin, the Supreme Court refined the proportionality prong of Unocal to tilt the 
balance in favor of respecting the judgment of the target board. See id. 
214 Revlon, Inc. v. MacAndrews & Forbes, 506 A.2d 173, 182 (Del. 1986).  In 
Revlon, the Supreme Court refined the Unocal standard by announcing that 
whether a target company board acted properly in committing the company to a 
sale or change of control transaction would turn upon whether the board’s deci-
sion-making process, and its result, were reasonable. See id. 
215 Paramount Commc’ns, Inc. v. QVC Network, Inc., 637 A.2d 34, 45–46 (Del. 
1994) (specifying the criteria for “the range of reasonableness” of directors’ actions 
in Revlon-like situations). 
216 Blasius Indus., Inc. v. Atlas Corp., 564 A.2d 651, 659–60 (Del. Ch. 1988) 
(holding that where a board’s antitakeover defense involves a purposeful interfer-
ence with the exercise of the shareholders’ right to vote, that defense would be 
invalid unless the board can show a compelling justification). 
217 For an exhaustive treatment of the evolution of the heightened standards of 
review in the Delaware jurisprudence, see Jacobs, supra note 210, at 160–68. See 
also T. Richard Giovannelli, Revisiting Revlon: The Rumors of Its Demise Have 
Been Greatly Exaggerated, 37 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1513 (1996). 
218 Cf. SMITH, supra note 202, at 38 (arguing that “decision making that is a 
hybrid between law and equity is likely to be superior to law or equity alone”).  Our 
view is that, overall, Delaware’s “predictable” equity is a hybrid between pure 
equity and law. 
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through the tradeoff between agency costs and market ineffi-
ciency implied by the new hybrid corporation.  Our recommen-
dation in favor of private contracting directly follows from this 
systemic indeterminacy.  But if the economic system is indeter-
minate, then the judicial system must also leave room for inde-
terminacy under the rubric of discretion in adjudication.  With 
the rise of the hybrid corporation, the range of possible out-
comes, including openings for taking opportunistic advantage, 
becomes wider than ever.219 
As put by Henry Smith in his analysis of equity jurisdic-
tion, opportunism is a “behavior that is undesirable but that 
cannot be cost-effectively captured—defined, detected, and de-
terred—by explicit ex ante rulemaking.”220 This open-ended 
definition of opportunism captures both the traditional risk of 
moral hazard by managers and the new forms of self-interest 
on the side of empowered shareholders (such as short-termist 
behavior), as well as the  risk of abuses of bargaining power by 
either managers or shareholders.  Indeed, we view manager-
shareholder contracting as an outcome that is superior to the 
unilateral shareholder imposition of business decisions.  It is, 
however, an outcome not immune from inefficient distortions 
arising from abuse of bargaining power.  Equitable adjudica-
tion is the instrument that allows the Delaware courts to ex-
post define, detect, and deter these distortions.221 
Viewed through this lens, the landmark decision in Schnell 
v. Chris-Craft Industries, Inc.222—which commentators regard 
as the beginning of an era in which the equity model progres-
sively came to dominate the law model in Delaware jurispru-
dence223—provides a paradigmatic example of the use of 
equitable adjudication to prevent managerial opportunism.  In 
that decision, reversing the prior ruling of the Chancery 
Court,224 the Delaware Supreme Court sanctioned the board’s 
219 Viewing equity as appropriately undetermined has deep historical roots, 
going back to the Aristotles’ Nicomachean Ethics.  As explained in Aquinas’ Com-
mentary on the Nicomachean Ethics, Aristotle believed that “because the material 
of human acts is indeterminate . . . the law[ ] must be indeterminate in the sense 
that it is not absolutely rigid.” 1 THOMAS  AQUINAS, COMMENTARY  ON  THE 
NICOMACHEAN ETHICS 466 (C.I. Litzinger trans., 1964). 
220 Smith, supra note 202, at 9. 
221 Likewise, the flexibility of equity adjudication is the means that allows 
judges to detect and mitigate the externalities that manager-shareholder con-
tracting may impose on third parties, but the discussion of this use of equity 
exceeds the scope of this paper. 
222 285 A.2d 437 (Del. 1971). 
223 See Jacobs, supra note 188, at 6. 
224 See id. at 7. 
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unilateral, and opportunistic, amendment of the company’s by-
laws to the detriment of the company’s shareholders by holding 
that “inequitable action [by corporate fiduciaries] does not be-
come permissible simply because it is legally possible.”225 
Using the same lens, reconsider now the philosophy of the 
Delaware courts in employing heightened standards of review 
for evaluating the board’s adoption of defensive measures. 
When, during the takeover era, Delaware first allowed boards of 
directors to deploy the poison pill to impose on hostile tender 
offerors the added time and expense of control transfer by 
proxy contest,226 responses grounded in agency theory were 
understandably condemnatory.  Today, with the hybrid corpo-
ration in view and the benefit of hindsight, we can recharacter-
ize the takeover era cases as a defensible grant to the board of 
bargaining power against investors.  However, as made evident 
by the progressive refinement of the heightened standards of 
review, the grant was never so absolute as to leave investors 
defenseless.  The equity tools employed in those evaluations, 
embodied in open-ended concepts like “proportional” and “dra-
conian,” reflect the insight that opportunistic abuses must be 
dealt with equitably, on the specific facts of the case.227 
Along similar lines, Delaware has also recently taken the 
lead in limiting the assumption that collective action problems 
make public shareholders incapable of self-protection and 
uniquely susceptible to exploitation.228  Law that follows from 
these assumptions is beginning to be revised as courts and 
legislatures reappraise the shareholders’ ability to use their 
governance levers.  Stepping up to the plate of this revision 
process, Delaware has limited the application of enhanced fi-
duciary scrutiny of mergers,229 streamlined the shareholder 
225 Schnell v. Chris-Craft Industries, Inc., 285 A.2d 437, 439 (Del. 1971).  In 
Chris-Craft, the incumbent directors decided to amend the bylaws for the sole 
purpose of setting the annual meeting date five weeks earlier than the original 
date so as to materially disadvantage the dissidents and substantially perpetuate 
their control over the corporation. Id. 
226 See, e.g., Moran v. Household Int’l, Inc., 500 A.2d 1346, 1355–57 
(Del.1985) (finding that Director’s decision to implement a poison pill was pro-
tected by the business judgment rule). 
227 Jacobs, supra note 188, at 4–5. 
228 See Jacobs, supra note 210, at 171–72. 
229 See Corwin v. KKR Fin. Holdings LLC, 125 A.3d 304, 312–14 (Del. 2015) 
(confirming that business judgment is the appropriate standard of review in post-
closing damages suits involving a merger subject to Revlon scrutiny that has been 
approved by a fully informed, uncoerced majority of the disinterested stockhold-
ers); Kahn v. M&F Worldwide Corp., 88 A.3d 635, 644 (Del. 2014) (confirming that 
the business judgment standard of review applies to a parent-subsidiary merger 
that cashes out minority shareholders where the merger has been conditioned 
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merger approval process,230 and refrained from imposing strict 
scrutiny on actions that increase the level of difficulty for ac-
tivist hedge funds.231 
It would be wrong to read these cases as the rote response 
of courts structurally unsympathetic to the prerogatives of 
newly empowered shareholders.  Rather, these decisions are 
better viewed as directed against opportunistic exploitation of 
new shareholder prerogatives.  Cases on hedge fund activism 
are especially telling.  In Yucaipa America Alliance Fund II, L.P. 
v. Riggio,232 for example, the Delaware Chancery Court refused 
to apply the line of cases that prohibits management impair-
ment of the shareholder franchise233 to invalidate a poison pill 
with a 20 percent ownership threshold promulgated to frus-
trate a proxy contestant.234  The ruling channeled activist ob-
jections to management defensive tactics to the more 
permissive Unocal standard of review,235 appropriately re-
calibrating the parties’ bargaining power.  In Third Point LLC v. 
Ruprecht,236 the Chancery Court went further still, rejecting a 
Unocal claim brought by an activist proxy contestant against a 
poison pill with an innovative 10 percent ownership threshold 
on the grounds that the contestant had power to influence 
results and had an unobstructed path to appeal to the wider 
shareholder voting population.  And in the most recent case, In 
upon the approval of both an independent and adequately-empowered special 
committee of directors and an uncoerced,  informed vote of a majority of the 
minority stockholders).  This is a significant cutback on the merger’s zone of 
exposure to fiduciary scrutiny under the Revlon doctrine. 
230 See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 251(h) (2019) (introducing the medium form 
merger, a new mode that relies on friendly tender offers and bypasses the share-
holder vote where the acquirer does not hold a 90% stake of the target ex ante). 
231 See, e.g., Yucaipa America Alliance Fund II, L.P. v. Riggio, 1 A.3d 310, 329 
(Del. Ch. 2010), aff’d, 15 A.3d 218 (Del. 2011) (applying Unocal’s reasonable 
standard to the Board’s decision to implement a poison pill defense against ac-
tivist shareholders); Third Point, LLC v. Ruprecht, No. 9469-VCP, 2014 WL 
1922029, at *15–16 (Del. Ch. May 2, 2014) (same). 
232 1 A.3d at 310. 
233 The line begins with Blasius Indus., Inc. v. Atlas Corp., 564 A.2d 651, 659 
(Del. Ch. 1988). 
234 See Yucaipa, 1 A.3d at 330–36 (finding that the “compelling justification” 
standard, under Blasius Industries and its progeny, did not apply). 
235 See Unocal Corp. v. Mesa Petroleum Co., 493 A.2d 946, 955 (Del. 1985); 
see also Unitrin, Inc. v. Am. Gen. Corp., 651 A.2d 1361, 1375 (Del. 1995) (“[A] 
board must sustain its burden of demonstrating that, even under Unocal’s stan-
dard of enhanced judicial scrutiny, its actions deserved the protection of the 
traditional business judgment rule.”); Moran v. Household Int’l, Inc., 500 A.2d 
1346, 1356 (Del. 1985) (same). 
236 Third Point, 2014 WL 1922029, at *20–*21. 
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re PLX Technology Inc. Stockholders Litigation,237 the Delaware 
Chancery Court went so far as to find conflicted misconduct by 
the activist hedge fund, while remarking that “[a]ctivist hedge 
funds . . . are impatient shareholders, who look for value and 
want it realized in the near or intermediate term.  They tell 
managers how to realize the value and challenge publicly those 
who resist the advice, using the proxy contest as a threat.”238 
The court once again focused on the imbalance in the parties’ 
bargaining power, an imbalance created by hedge funds’ ability 
to exploit the proxy contest to lower the manager’s disagree-
ment point.239 
Commenting on these developments, Justice Jacobs sug-
gests that “we may witness . . . a replay of the 1980s, where the 
[Delaware] courts were forced to fashion new principles to rede-
fine the power of the board to oppose hostile takeover bids by 
third-party bidders.”240 The significant difference is that, “[t]his 
time . . . the ‘outsiders’ will literally be ‘insiders’”241—the corpo-
ration’s own shareholders, which have grown sufficiently em-
powered unilaterally to determine corporate outcomes even in 
the context of off-market contracting rather than by using mar-
ket levers.  If, as we suggest, shareholder power is here to stay, 
we expect the trend toward the reversal of prior shareholder 
solicitude in Delaware decisions to continue, with equitable 
adjudication providing the legal platform to support this trend. 
We have a final remark.  A generation ago, Ed Rock effec-
tively defended the Delaware courts against charges of man-
agement capture by highlighting the moral aspect of their 
decision-making.242  We add an additional characterization: 
the Delaware courts have proven themselves to be economi-
cally astute.  Their equitable, consequentialist approach dis-
plays a better grasp of the operative economics than that of the 
law professoriate that derived a legal theory from J-M’s partial 
equilibrium model. 
237 In re PLX Tech. Inc. Stockholders Litig., No. 9880–VCL, 2018 WL 5018535 
(Del. Ch. Oct. 16, 2018). 
238 Id. at *41 (alteration in original) (quoting Bratton & Wachter, supra note 
61, at 682). 
239 See supra text accompanying note 186. 
240 Jacobs, supra note 210, at 171. 
241 Id. 
242 Edward B. Rock, Saints and Sinners: How Does Delaware Corporate Law 
Work?, 44 UCLA L. REV. 1009, 1013–14 (1997). 
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CONCLUSION 
If one goes to Westlaw and searches the phrase “general 
equilibrium theory” in the law review database, one learns that 
markets can be presumed to work and that regulation for pur-
poses other than wealth reallocation is justified only by an 
affirmative showing of market failure.  Even then, regulatory 
intervention must be further tested for political failure under 
public and social choice theory.243  This normative extension of 
GE might have been justified around 1960, before contempo-
rary law and economics even existed, but thereafter the exten-
sion had no theoretical support.  Until recently, however, the 
only harm was inaccuracy, while structural problem remained 
only nascent.  This has changed with the rise of empowered 
shareholders.  Now, market-based coordination of business 
planning has become a fact of corporate life, making it no 
longer possible to ignore the real lesson of GE.  That lesson is 
that the market cannot efficiently coordinate the economy, un-
less one is willing to rely on Herculean assumptions. 
It follows that it is not safe to assume that the agency cost 
reduction stemming from shareholder empowerment maxi-
mizes value.  Instead, this Article has shown that, in the pre-
sent context, economic theory poses a fundamental trade-off 
between agency costs and market inefficiency.  Under these 
tradeoffs, no template for efficient corporate law reform cur-
rently exists.  The question, then, is this: Where should the 
theory of the firm go from here?  We answer that a fresh start 
will be needed.  Even as agency theory’s moral hazard account 
no longer suffices to describe the salient problems in corporate 
governance, there can be no reversion to the earlier view of 
corporations as hierarchies operating outside of markets, for 
243 Robert D. Cooter, Normative Failure Theory of Law, 82 CORNELL L. REV. 947, 
951–52 (1997); see also Robert D. Cooter, Decentralized Law for a Complex Econ-
omy: The Structural Approach to Adjudicating the New Law Merchant, 144 U. PA. L. 
REV. 1643, 1690 (1996) (“Adam Smith suggested, and general equilibrium theory 
proved, that competition for wealth in markets allocates resources efficiently.”). 
One also learns that general equilibrium theory upholds the shareholder value 
maximization norm.  Roberta Romano, Corporate Governance in the Aftermath of 
the Insurance Crisis, 39 EMORY L.J. 1155, 1164 (1990).  Our search, conducted on 
July 22, 2017, yielded 122 articles.  In the overwhelming majority, GE is cited, in 
passing, in connection with a reference to neoclassical economic theory or within 
a book title.  Only four articles (one of which was co-written by one of us) high-
lighted the difficulties discussed herein. See K.J. Martijn Cremers & Simone M. 
Sepe, The Shareholder Value of Empowered Boards, 68 STAN. L. REV. 67, 109–17 
(2016); Huang, supra note 64, at 491; Lee, supra note 64, at 120; Alejandro Nadal, 
Coasean Fictions: Law and Economics Revisited, 5 SEATTLE J. FOR SOC. JUST. 569, 
588–89 (2007). 
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market forces now direct business decisions at the highest 
level. 
An attempt to provide a new operational model of the firm 
goes beyond the scope of this Article—that formidable job will 
most likely require a whole literature rather than a single inter-
vention.  We can, however, go back to basics and suggest which 
bodies of economic theory can assist the enterprise.  Our last 
prediction is that the future lies with the economics of mecha-
nism design, which can assist in answering several questions 
about the efficient structuring of the corporate bargaining pro-
cess.  These questions include issues of optimal board deci-
sion-making, shareholder biases, conditions that may trigger 
such biases, as well as questions on how to internalize exter-
nalities that incomplete markets cannot internalize and how to 
provide managerial incentives that are compatible with not 
only the shareholder interest but also the interest of society as 
a whole. 
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